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A General Rule of Law
is Needed to Define Public Use
in Patent Cases*
BY KATHERINE E. WHITE*
INTRODUCTION
All law needs certainty and predictability in order to provide the
public with proper notice and define the boundaries of legally
Ipermissible conduct. This is especially true in patent cases
where a significant property interest is at stake. Consistency in judicial
decisionmaking is critical in advancing public confidence in the rule of
law. In order to achieve consistency, similarly situated cases should enjoy
comparable outcomes. Such an approach evinces the appearance of equal
treatment further promoting a sense of justice.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is the
typical path of appeals for patent cases' has moved away from rendering
this type of consistency in interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)2 in public use
and on sale bar cases.3 Historically, the Supreme Court devoted attention
to the underlying policies regarding the public use and on sale bars in
"Copyright © 2000 by Katherine E. White.
"" Katherine E. White is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Wayne State
University Law School in Detroit, Michigan and a Regent at the University of
Michigan. She is a Fulbright Senior Scholar hosted at the Max Planck Institute for
Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law in Munich,
Germany. She received a B.S.E. from Princeton University, a J.D. from the
University of Washington, and an LL.M. in intellectual property from the George
Washington University School of Law. She gratefully acknowledges Robert
Abrams, Danielle Conway-Jones, Eric Dobrusin, Zanita Fenton, Jessica Litman,
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'See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
2 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
3 See infra Part M.
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§ 102(b). Adhering to the purposes behind the bars, the Supreme Court
maintained two lines of analysis consistent with the statutory division
between the public use and on sale bars.4 The Federal Circuit, however, has
moved away from that approach. Instead, the Federal Circuit has developed
a "totality of the circumstances" approach in its analysis. Although striving
to be sensitive to the equities in each case, this totality approach has led to
a blurring of the public use and on sale issues. This methodology has failed
to consistently elucidate the policies behind the public use and on sale bars.
Consequently, this approach has left too much room for judicial discretion
that could lead to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions.
Recently, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court
rejected the totality of the circumstances test in on sale cases, moving
towards a more rule-based approach in its analysis. In doing so, the Court
replaced the totality of the circumstances test with a more concrete general
rule of law in an attempt to create greater predictability in resolving when
a sale has transpired.6 This approach resonates with the concepts articulated
in Justice Antonin Scalia's essay, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules.7 In
this essay, Justice Scalia criticizes using the totality of the circumstances
test too readily as a mechanism for finding justice. He explores the
"dichotomy between the 'general rule of law' and the 'personal discretion
to do justice.' ,,1 Giving judges the personal discretion to do justice often
appears to create flexibility in a statutory framework that seems too rigid
to dispense justice. Scalia, however, notes that "judicial decisions should
not be overrated." There are competing values in finding the "perfect"
answer, one of which "is the appearance of equal treatment."' 0
In Pfaff, the Supreme Court removed the totality of the circumstances
test in on sale bar cases. This shift, however, does not address the
remaining and more difficult public use strand of § 102(b)."1 This Article
proposes an extension of the Pfaff approach and a specific rule that
reinvigorates the historic distinction between public use and on sale issues,
4 See infra Part II.
5 Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304 (1998).
6 See id. at 311-12.
7Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989). "This essay was first delivered as the Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr. Lecture




"135 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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consequently enabling cases to be decided more predictably. After
reviewing the early Supreme Court cases and policies, as well as the
Federal Circuit cases, this Article will conclude that, after Pfaff, a general
rule of law is needed to determine public use in patent cases.
12
Part I of this Article gives a general overview of the pertinent precepts
of patent law and theory. Part II recounts the Supreme Court's historical
treatment of the public use and on sale bars, pointing out that, in its
legal analysis, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the primary
policies underlying the bars. Part m presents a general overview of the
Federal Circuit's application of the totality of the circumstances test in
both public use and on sale cases. Part IV discusses the limitations of a
policy approach to legal analysis using the totality of the circumstances
test in public use and on sale cases. Part V proposes a general rule of law
test to determine whether there has been a public use. The proposed test
incorporates the policies underlying the public use and on sale bars as well
as the analytical framework of the Supreme Court's early cases. Part VI
examines the Federal Circuit cases and compares that court's analysis
with the legal approach used when applying the proposed test. Some
cases may have been decided the same way, but different questions would
have been asked. Some cases would have been decided differently if the
court had adhered to the policies underlying the bars as well as the
analytical framework of the Supreme Court's early cases. Part VII is the
conclusion.
I. GENERAL OVERVIEW
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."'" This clause "reflects a balance
between the need to encourage innovation andthe avoidance ofmonopolies
which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress
of Science and useful Arts."14 In accordance with this clause of the
Constitution, "Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlimited
duration, nor may it 'authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
12 See infra Part VII.
'3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
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access to materials already available.' "1 5 "[T]he ultimate goal ofthepatent
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure."' 6 "[A]fter the expiration ofa federal patent, the subject
matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of
federal law."'7
The patent grant awards an inventor a right to exclude others from
practicing the invention for a limited time in exchange for public disclosure
of the invention. Consistent with these principles, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bars
a person from acquiring a patent if the invention sought to be patented has
been "patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States.'" These
prohibitions are called the public use and on sale bars, respectively.
Although the public use and on sale bars share the same statutory basis in
§ 102(b), they have different policy emphases.' 9
In analyzing Supreme Court case law, it is apparent that the public use
bar has two primary policy interests: (1) forfeiture or dedication of the
invention to the public; and (2) detrimental reliance.20 The public use bar
"5 Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)); see also
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) ("If the public were already in
possession and common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might
be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an
exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was already common.").
16 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
171d. at 152 ("[P]laintiffs' right to the use of the embossed periphery expired
with their patent, and the public had the same right to make use of it as if it had
never been patented." (quoting Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572
(1893))).
18 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
19 See Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc.,
141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
0 Express abandonment is another way in which an inventor can lose patent
rights. Express abandonment, however, is primarily addressed under § 102(c),
which states: "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... he has abandoned
the invention." 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994). Another incidence of abandonment is
addressed in § 102(g). It reads, in pertinent part: "[a] person shall be entitled to a
patent unless... before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made
in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."Id.
§ 102(g). This relates to the concept of "spurring." Spurring is when an inventor
keeps the invention secret and only files when competitors begin to make the
invention. When the inventor has realized the value of the invention, the inventor
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prohibits the patenting of an invention if an inventor has. forfeited or
dedicated the invention to the public, orthe public has detrimentally relied
on the invention as part of the public domain. If the inventor has forfeited
or dedicated the invention to the public, the inventor may not remove the
invention from the public and obtain a patent over the invention. If the
public has detrimentally relied on the public nature of the invention, it
should not be extracted from the public domain.
In contrast, the on sale bar is to prevent an inventor from extending the
patent monopoly beyond the statutorily prescribed time period, twenty
years from the date of filing for the patent plus one year.2' This one-year
period is called a grace period, which permits an inventor time to decide
whether or not to file a patent application Another purpose of the one-
is spurred into filing. Section 102(g) prohibits granting a patent to an inventor who
abandons, suppresses, or conceals an invention. See id.
23 See Continental Plastic, 141 F.3d at 1079 ("The primary policy underlying
the 'public use' case is that of detrimental public reliance, whereas the primary
policy underlying an 'on-sale' case is that of prohibiting the commercial
exploitation of the design beyond the statutorily prescribed time period.").
I Because filing for a patent can be incredibly expensive, the one-year grace
period allows the inventor to determine whether or not filing will be worth the
time, expense, and effort. Although the grace period works against the concept of
publicly disclosed inventions becoming public property immediately upon
disclosure, it is a compromise giving the inventor time to decide whether or not to
file a patent application. The first patent act, passed in 1790, did not include a grace
period. Congress authorized granting a patent to anyone who invented something
not before known or used. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109. In
1836, Congress passed another patent act that enacted the on sale and public use
bar provisions. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. This Act
provided, in pertinent part:
[A]ny person or persons having discovered or invented any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
not known or used by others before his or their discovery or invention
thereof, and not, at the time of his application for a patent, in public use or
on sale, with his consent or allowance, as the inventor or discoverer; and
shall desire to obtain an exclusive property therein, may make application
in writing to the Commissioner of Patents, expressing such desire, and the
Commissioner, on due proceedings had, may grant a patent therefor.
Id. The 1836 Act did not provide a grace period. Thus, the inventor had to file an
application before putting the invention in public use or on sale. In 1839, Congress
enacted a two-year grace period allowing inventors two years to apply for a patent
after having placed the invention in public use or on sale. This two-year grace
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
year limit is to give inventors an incentive to file their patent applications
within one year of making their inventions public. In order to encourage
prompt filing in the Patent Office, § 102(b) creates a statutory period in
which a patent must be filed. This is necessary because, unlike most
countries, the United States awards patents to the first-to-invent, and not
the first-to-file the patent application.23 Section 102(b) is an unnecessary
provision in first-to-file systems because the first filer has priority of
invention, regardless of who invented first.24
The public use and on sale bars to patentability preclude an inventor
from obtaining a patent in the United States ifthe invention is in public use
or on sale inthe United States more than one year before the application for
patent.' Thus, the "critical date" is one year prior to filing an application
for patent. 6 Because an affirmative finding that an invention is subject to
period was reduced to one year in 1939. See Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53
Stat. 1212, 1212; S. REP. No. 76-876, at 1-3 (1939). Currently, the grace period is
one year. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
' In the United States, the original inventor may not always be the inventor that
is given priority under the first-to-invent system. If an original inventor abandons,
suppresses, or conceals his invention, he or she will lose priority of invention. See
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994); see also Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477,497
(1850).
It is well known that centuries ago discoveries were made in certain arts the
fruits of which have come down to us, but the means by which the work
was accomplished are at this day unknown. The knowledge has been lost
for ages. Yet it would hardly be doubted, if any one now discovered an art
thus lost, and it was a useful improvement, that, upon a fair construction of
the act of Congress, he would be entitled to a patent. Yet he would not
literally be the first and original inventor. But he would be the first to confer
the public the benefit of the invention. He would discover what is unknown,
and communicate knowledge which the public had not the means of
obtaining without his invention.
Id.
24See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
2 See id. § 102(b).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.
Id.
' "Critical date" is a term of art defined as the date one year prior to filing the
patent application. If a public use or sale takes place prior to the critical date, this
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a public use or on sale bar eliminates patent rights, a court's application of
the legal test to make such a determination has caused significant contro-
versy.
In recent times, "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the use or
sale is the test used to evaluate public use and on sale bar issues.27 This test
has been criticized as being unnecessarily vague.28 As applied, this test is
problematic because it does not require that the primary policies underlying
the public use and on sale bars be subsumed into the test (e.g., dedication
to the public, detrimental public reliance, and prohibiting commercial
exploitation ofthe invention beyond the statutorily prescribed period).2 9 In
looking at the totality of the circumstances, the courts are not required to
treat the public use and on sale bars as serving distinct and clear purposes.
Because a more rule-oriented approach in analyzing these issues has not
been used, their distinct and separate purposes have been overlooked.
The Federal Circuit has adopted the following underlying policies in
applying the totality of the circumstances test: (1) discouraging the
removal, from the public domain, of inventions that the public reasonably
has "come to believe are freely available; ... [(2)] 'favoring the prompt
and widespread disclosure of new inventions;' 30 (3) allowing the inventor
a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to determine the
potential economic value of a patent; and (4) prohibiting the inventor from
commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater than the
statutorily prescribed time.3"
is a violation of § 102(b) and patenting of the invention is prohibited. See Petrolite
Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
27 See id. ("This court has emphasized that the totality of the circumstances must
be considered in determining whether aparticular event creates an on-sale orpublic
use bar.") (citations omitted).
I See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court also observed that the
Patent Act's on-sale and public use provisions strive to provide 'inventors with a
definite standard for determining when a patent application must be filed' ")
(quoting Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304, 311 (1998)).
9 See Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc.,
141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30 General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
31 See id. (citing Patrick 3. Barrett, Note, New Guidelines for Applying the On
Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REv. 730, 732-35 (1972)); see also In re
Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari
Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Thomas K. Landry, Certainty
1999-20001
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"To give effect to the underlying policies, the court will want to consider
the totality of circumstances relating to the character and extent of
commercial activities, the type of invention and its stage of development
... along with the character and extent of bona fide experimentation." '32
These underlying policies appear to consider the primary policies of the
public use and on sale bars. However, because these policies are not
explicitly part of a legal rule, the public use and on sale bars are not
evaluated as distinct and separate issues.33 This policy approach has caused
uncertainty as to when the statutory bar clock begins to run, especially in
on sale bar cases.
The totality of the circumstances test for on sale bar analysis does not
clearly define when a sale or offer for sale has transpired. The purpose of
the on sale bar is to prevent inventors from extending their monopoly
period beyond the statutory term.34 In order to start the one-year statutory
bar clock running, it is necessary to determine the timing of when a sale has
occurred. The Federal Circuit has rejected the idea that a physical
embodiment of an invention is required in determining whether or not a
sale has taken place.35 This is troublesome because it is unclear how an
invention can be on sale or offered for sale if it has not been reduced to
practice.36 In other words, how can an invention be sold or offered for sale
if there is no physical embodiment of the invention? Difficulty in
determining when a sale has occurred contributes to the totality of the
circumstances test for on sale bar cases being unnecessarily vague.37
Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc." illustrates the uncertainty caused by
the totality of the circumstances test in determining whether a sale has
transpired. In this case, Texas Instruments' ("TI") representatives
andDiscretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine ofEquivalents, and
Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1163-69 (1994)
(arguing that Barrett did not intend the underlying policies he articulated in his
student note to become a judicially-created test).
32Western Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840,845 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
" See Landry, supra note 31, at 1172.
3 See Continental Plastic, 141 F.3d at 1079.
See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
36See id. (defining reduction to practice to mean that there must be "a physical
embodiment [of the invention] which includes all limitations of the claim").
17 See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
38 Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct.
304 (1998).
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approached Mr. Pfaff ("Pfaff") to invent sockets for testing leadless chip
carriers. More than one year before he filed a patent application, Pfaff
showed a sketch of his concept to TI's representatives. Before the critical
date, TI sent Pfaff a written confirmation of a previously placed oral
purchase order for 30,100 new sockets. "In accordwith his normal practice,
Pfaff did not make and test a prototype of the new device before offering
to sell it in commercial quantities."'39 The trial court held that because there
was no physical embodiment of the invention before the critical date, there
was no on sale bar, despite the commercialization before the critical date.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a physical embodiment is not
required to trigger an on sale bar. "Accordingly, the appropriate question
is whether the invention was substantially complete at the time of sale such
that there was 'reason to expect that it would work for its intended purpose
upon completion.' "10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine
whether the commercial marketing of a newly invented product may mark
the beginning of the 1-year period even though the invention has not yet
been reduced to practice."41
In Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc.,42 the Supreme Court eliminated the
totality of the circumstances test from the on sale bar analysis. In doing so,
the Court replaced this test with a general rule of law to create more
predictability in resolving when a sale has transpired.43 The Pfafftest has
two prongs for determining when a sale has occurred: (1) "the product must
be the subject of a commercial offer for sale;" and (2) "the invention must
be ready for patenting."'4 The Court, however, did not address how
39Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 307.
40 pfaf, 124 F.3d at 1434 (citations omitted).
41 pfaf, 119 S. Ct. at 307 (citing Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp.,
276 U.S. 358,383 (1928) ("A process is reduced to practice when it is successfully
performed. A machine is reduced to practice when it is assembled adjusted and
used. A manufacture is reduced to practice when it is completely manufactured. A




4 Id. at 312. The second prong:
[M]ay be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice
before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor
had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were




eliminating the totality of the circumstances test in on sale cases affects the
analysis for public use cases, as public use was not an issue in Pfaff.4
Historically, the Supreme Court has analyzedthe public use and on sale
bars in combination.4 7 Because these bars have separate policy reasons for
barring patentability, the analyses for determiningwhether there is a public
use or a sale should be distinct in order to provide clarity and definiteness
to these issues. On sale policy may not apply to public use distinctions and
vice versa. Commingling the public use and on sale inquiry obfuscates the
discourse, causing the policies and purposes behind these bars to
patentability to be discounted.
The main reason why courts have combined public use and on sale
issues stems from trying to analyze whether there has been an experimental
' See id.47 See International Tooth-Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1891)
("[W]here the use is mainly for the purposes of trade and profit, and the experiment
is merely incidental to that, the principal, and not the incident, must give character
to the use."); Smith & Griggs Mfg. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249,265 (1887) (holding
that the real purpose of the invention's use was to conduct the manufacturer's
business; the improvement and perfection of the machine were merely incidental
and subsidiary); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23-24 (1829).
[T]he first inventor cannot acquire a good title to a patent; if he suffers the
thing invented to go into public use, or to be publicly sold for use, before
he makes application for a patent. His voluntary act or acquiescence in the
public sale and use is an abandonment of his right; or rather creates a
disability to comply with the terms and conditions on which alone the
secretary of state is authorized to grant him a patent.
Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tone
Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding thatthe totality
of the circumstances of the case must comport with the policies underlying the
public use bar and noting the policies have been enumerated in the "on-sale"
context); LaBounty Mfg. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066,
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("a patentee may escape the section 102(b) bars on the
ground that the use or sale was experimental"); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics,
Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("To establish that an otherwise public use
or sale does not run afoul of section 102(b), it must be shown that the activity was
'substantially for purposes of experiment.' Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc.
828 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987)"); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1107-08
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that issues concerning public use or on sale bar "must
be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances"); Barmag Barmer
Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("[T]he policies which underlie the public use or on sale bar, in effect, define the
terms of the statute.") (citation omitted).
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use ofthe invention sufficient to overcome a statutory barto patentability.4 8
That is to say, if there has been experimentation on the invention to perfect
it for its intended purpose, such a use does not begin the statutory bar time
clock running. 9 This is called the experimental use doctrine. The experi-
41 See Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 20 (1939) ("A
mere experimental use is not the public use defined by the Act [of March 3, 1839],
but a single use for profit, not purposely hidden, is such. The ordinary use of a
machine or the practice of a process in a factory in the usual course of producing
articles for commercial purposes is a public use."); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90,
97 (1883) ("The construction and arrangement and purpose and mode of operation
and use of the bolts in the safes were necessarily known to the workmen who put
them in .... The safes were sold, and, apparently, no experiment and no
experimental use were thought to be necessary."); Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra,
L.L.C., 156 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (1998) ("If an embodiment of the claimed
invention was not offered for sale, we look to see if a substantially completed
embodiment of the claimed invention was offered for sale and 'there was reason
for a high degree of confidence that it would work for its intended purpose.'"
(quoting Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed.
Cir. 1997))), amended by Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra L.L.C., 178 F.3d 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); see Petrolite Corp., 96 F.3d at 1426 ("To establish that an otherwise
public use or sale does not run afoul of section 102(b), it must be shown that the
activity was 'substantially forpurposes of experiment.' ") (citation omitted); Allied
Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Commercial purpose underlies virtually every contact between inventor and
potential customer. When testing an invention entails customer contact, that does
not convert an otherwise experimental purpose into a public use."); RCA Corp. v.
Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Thus, having been
reduced to practice, a sale or offer to sell the.., invention is no longer justifiable
as experimental use."); Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona, Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) ("Any experimentation over one year before an application's filing date
must be for a bona fide experimental purpose rather than for commercial
exploitation .... If any commercial exploitation does occur, it must be merely
incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation to perfect the invention.")
(citation omitted); In re Brigance, 792 F.2d at 1108 ('While experimental use of
an invention prior to the critical date is not a bar, a review of the cases reveals that
the underlying experimental purposes were clearly supported by objective
evidence.... .") (footnote omitted); butsee Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens
Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (" 'public use'
and 'on sale bars,' while they share the same statutory basis, are grounded on
different policy emphases").
49 See Pennwalt Corp., 740 F.2d at 1581 ("Any experimentation over one year
before an application's filing date must be for a bona fide experimental purpose
rather than for commercial exploitation .... If any commercial exploitation does
1999-2000]
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mental use analysis is the confounding variable that has led to the
development of the totality of the circumstances test for public use and on
sale cases. When it is necessary for courts to determine whether or not a
use or sale is for experimental purposes, the issues of public use and on sale
become muddled and the focus shifts to whether or not the use is experi-
mental. Because public use and on sale issues have been treated together,
the elimination of the totality of the circumstances test for one necessarily
affects the other.
After reviewing the early Supreme Court cases and policies, as well as
the Federal Circuit cases, this Article concludes that, after Pfaff, a general
rule of law is needed to determine public use in patent cases. My proposed
test for public use is the following: (1) the invention must be dedicated to
the public or there must be detrimental public reliance that the invention is
in the public domain; and (2) the invention must be ready for patenting.
This test parallels the Pfafftest, replacing the first prong with the policies
behind the public use bar. The second prong is identical to the Pfafftest.
The proposed test recognizes the public use and on sale bars have the same
statutory basis, but treats them as distinct and separate issues.
II. SUPREME COURT'S HISTORICAL TREATMENT
OF THE PUBLIC USE AND ON SALE BARS
The Patent Act of 179350 prohibited patenting an invention that had
been in use or described in some public work before the patentee's
discovery. The prohibition, however, did not take the same form as it does
today. There was neither a grace period nor a specific prohibition against
selling the invention. Section 6 of the 1793 Act provided that the defendant
be permitted to argue in defense to a patent infiingement action, "that the
thing, thus secured by patent, was not originally discovered by the patentee,
but had been in use, or had been described in some public work, anterior
to the supposed discovery of the patentee."51 In Pennock v. Dialogue,' the
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of section 6. In doing so, the Court
focused its inquiry on two issues: whether the public had detrimentally
relied on the invention being in the public domain, and whether the
invention had been dedicated to the public:
occur, it must be merely incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation to
perfect the invention.") (citations omitted).
5 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 6.
51 d. (emphasis added).52Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
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If the public were already in possession and common use of an invention
fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming, that
the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to
monopolize that which was already common. There would be no quid pro
quo-no price for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the
inventor for... [the patent term].
... [T]rue construction of the [Patent A]ct is, that the first inventor
cannot acquire good title to a patent; if he suffers the thing invented to go
into public use, orto be publicly sold for use, before he makes application
for a patent His voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use
is an abandonment of his right; or rather creates a disability to comply
with the terms and conditions on which alone... [is the authority] to
grant him a patent.53
In the first paragraph of the quote, the Court emphasized the patent
monopoly is not to be granted for something already in common use,
regardless of the inventor's consent to its use.' If the invention is already
in common anduniversal use, the public has detrimentally relied on the fact
that the invention is in the public domain. In the second paragraph, the
Court highlights the inventor's actions. The question revolves around
whether the inventor forfeited or dedicated the invention to go into public
use, and not just whether the invention is in public use. The Court devotes
attention to the acts or acquiescence of the inventor.
As a separate issue, the Court discussed why selling an invention
beyond the allowed statutory period was against the Act's policy:
If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the
public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years
retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus
gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skiln and knowl-
edge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger of
competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be
53 Id. at 23-24. The term "abandonment," as used by the Court in this quote,
refers to the concept of the inventor's forfeiture or dedication of the invention to
the public. the term "abandonment," for purposes of this Article, is defined as an
intentional or express relinquishment of rights as covered in 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) or
in the context of § 102(g). Abandonment, in this context, will not be discussed in
detail in this Article, as it focuses on public use under § 102(b).
5
4 See id. at 23.
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allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther
[sic] use than what should be derived under it during... [the patent term];
it would materially retard the progress ofscience and the useful arts, and
give a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their
discoveries.
55
InPennock, the invention improved the art of making tubes or hose for
conveying air, water, and other fluids.5 6 The inventors-patentees completed
their invention in 1811 and did not file their application until 1818.Y They
consented to having approximately 13,000 feet of the subject hose
constructed and sold to several hose companies in Philadelphia.5 1 No
experimental use was alleged. The patentees, however, argued that because
the invention was sold with their permission, no abandonment of the
invention occurred. The Court disagreed, however, and deferred to the
jury's verdict, which found the invention had been abandoned or dedicated
to the public. The Court emphasized the importance of looking at the acts
or acquiescence of the patentees to furnish proof of abandonment or
dedication to the public:
It has not been, and indeed cannot be denied, that an inventor may
abandon his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the public. This
inchoate right, thus once gone, cannot afterwards be resumed at his
pleasure; for, where gifts are once made to the public in this way, they
become absolute. Thus, if a man dedicates away or other easement to the
public, it is supposed to carry with it a permanent right of user. The
question which generally arises at trials, is a question of fact, rather than
of law; whether the acts or acquiescence of the party furnish in the given
case, satisfactory proof of an abandonment or dedication of the invention
to the public. 9
55 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Here, the Court describes the concept of "spur-
ring," where an inventor keeps the invention secret and only files when competitors
begin to make the invention. When the inventor has realized the value of the
invention, the inventor is spurred into filing. See id. Under the present patent
statute, § 102(g) prohibits an inventor who abandons, suppresses, or conceals an
invention from being entitled to a patent There was no express statutory
prohibition of spurring in the Patent Act of 1793. See supra note 23.
6 See Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 14.
57 See id. at 8.
58 See id. at 3.
59Id. at 16.
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The patentees in Pennock undermined the policies of both the public
use and on sale bars. The following acts were evidence of the patentees'
forfeiture or dedication of the invention to the public: (1) delaying seven
years to file the patent application after the invention was complete; (2)
making and selling 13,000 feet of hose with the patentees' permission; and
(3) selling the invention to those skilled in the art. After the public had
fairly acquired possession of the invention, the inventors could not obtain
a patent to take away what was in the public domain and put it back into
their private hands. Although the sale of the hose is referred to in this
public use analysis, the underlying focus of the concern stems from the
inventor's forfeiture or dedication of the invention to the public and not the
extension of the patent term, which is the concern for on sale cases. The
invention was complete and ready for patenting.
In Pennock, the question of whether there had been a public use
centered on whether the inventor dedicated the invention to the public or
whether the public had detrimentally relied on the invention being in the
public domain (e.g., the invention was in general or universal use). In later
cases, the issue of experimental use of an invention becomes a prominent
question in determining whether or not a use is considered public.
Experimental use becomes an issue because a use for experimental
purposes is not considered a public use under the statute.6' If an invention
is still being experimented upon, it is not ready for its intended purpose. In
essence, an application for a patent cannot be filed because the invention
is not ready for patenting. Thus, experimental use can be subsumed into the
second prong of both the Pfaffand the proposed test: the invention must be
ready for patenting.
If the reason for a sale or use is primarily for experimental purposes,
the use or sale does not bar patentability.6 ' In evaluating experimental use,
I See City of Elizabethv. AmericanNicholsonPavement Co., 97 U.S. 126,134
(1877) (stating that an inventor's use of an invention for experimental purposes,
even if in public, has never been regarded as a public use); Allied Colloids Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The law
recognizes that the inventor may test the invention, in public if that is reasonably
appropriate to the invention, without incurring a public use bar."); Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (determining
whether an invention works for its intended purpose in its intended environment
is not a statutory public use); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724
F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reasoning that an experimental use, although not
secretive, still bars the public use conclusion).
6 See Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("Any experimentation... [beyond the grace period] must be for a bona fide
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the public use and on sale bar analyses have become intertwined and are
often not separately evaluated. Instead, the analysis revolves around
whether the use or sale is for experimental purposes rather than on the
statutory issues of whether the invention is in public use or on sale. Failing
to separate the inquiries does not constrain the courts and require them to
ask the following important questions: (1) whether there has been a
commercial sale; (2) whether the invention has been dedicated to the public
or whether the public has detrimentally relied on the invention being in the
public domain; and (3) whether the invention was ready for patenting prior
to the critical date.
The seminal case on experimental use is City ofElizabeth v. American
Nicholson Pavement Co.6' In this case the Supreme Court evaluated not
only whether the invention had been dedicated to the public but also
whether the use was experimental. 63 The plaintiff, Nicholson, invented and
patented an inexpensive process for "constructing wooden blockpavements
upon a foundation along a street or roadway... [so] as to provide against
the slipping of the horses' feet, against noise, against unequal wear, and
against rot."' The defendant, the City of Elizabeth, used this pavement
without Nicholson's permission. As a defense to infringement, the
defendant argued that the patent was invalid because the inventor had
publicly used the invention beyond the grace period. Nicholson arguedthat
this use was necessary to properly test whether the road surface was
adequate for highway traffic.
65
In order to evaluate whether the use was a public one, the Court found
it "necessary to examine the circumstances under which this pavement was
put down... [in public view]." 66 The Court noted that it was evident that
the inventor did not intend to abandon his invention because he filed a
caveat of his invention in the Patent Office in 1847.67 The Court further
noted that he laid the pavement "for the purpose of testing its qualities."68
experimental purpose rather than for commercial exploitation. If any commercial
exploitation does occur, it must be merely incidental to the primary purpose of
experimentation to perfect the invention.") (citations omitted).
62 City ofElizabeth, 97 U.S. at 126.
63 See id. at 133 ("It is perfectly clear from the evidence that he did not intend
to abandon his right to a patent.").
64 Id. at 127.
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He constructed and laid down the pavement alone. He financed the use
himself. The inventor checked the road surface daily to assess its
durability.69
In analyzing this case, the Supreme Court made a distinction between
public use and a use that is publicly visible. Even though the invention was
publicly visible, the Court did not find the use to be a public one under the
statute. The Court stated:
That the use of the pavement in question was public in one sense cannot
be disputed. But can it be said that the invention was in public use? The
use of an invention by the inventor himself, or any other person under his
direction, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to
perfection, has never been regarded as such a use.
7 °
The Court added that "the nature of a street pavement is such that it
cannot be experimented upon satisfactorily except on a highway, which is
always public."' The Court emphasized that this "use is not a public use,
within the meaning of the statute, so long as the inventor is engaged, in
good faith, in testing its operation."12 The invention may need to be
improved or altered. The only way to determine what improvements need
to be made is to experiment, even if the experimentation is in public?3
The Court looked at the following factors to determine whether or not
the use was experimental: (1) did the inventor voluntarily allow others to
make or use the invention?; (2) did the inventor sell the invention for
general use?; (3) did the inventor maintain control over the invention?; (4)
did the inventor lose title to a patent? In looking at these factors, the Court
found the use to be experimental, thereby negating public use.74 These
factors are reminiscent of factors later used by the Federal Circuit to
evaluate public use in the context of experimental use, under the totality of
the circumstances test.75
69 See id.
70 Id. at 134 (citing GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTS § 381 (4th ed. 1873); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833)).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 135.
7 See id.
74 See id.
I See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that Mr. Lough "did not control the uses of his prototypes by third parties before
the critical date, failed to keep records of the alleged experiments, and did not place
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In this case, there was no evidence that the inventor dedicated his
invention to the public. This was exhibited through the inventor's conduct,
from laying the pavement himself to his daily visits to monitor the
invention. Such acts do not indicate a forfeiture or dedication of the
invention to the public. The Court, however, did not analyze whether there
had been detrimental public reliance that the invention was in the public
domain. It is possible there was some public reliance, because a similar
road was laid in the City of Elizabeth, which motivated the lawsuit.
Because the Court found that the use was experimental, negating public
use, the detrimental reliance inquiry was somewhat unnecessary.76
In Egbert v. Lippmann," the Supreme Court faced a situation quite
different from that in City of Elizabeth. Instead of the nature of the
invention being such that it could only be tested in a public setting, the
invention here, corset-springs, are inherently used and tested in secret. The
Court said that even if "some inventions are by their very character only
capable of being used where they cannot be seen or observed by the public
eye... [the use can be a public one if the] inventor sells a machine of
which his invention forms a part, and allows it to be used without
restriction of any kind."8 In Egbert, the issue was whether the record
sustained the defense that the patented invention had been publicly used
beyond the allowed two-year grace period.79
In Egbert, Mr. Barnes invented a flexible and pliable pair of corset-
springs in 1855 that would not break, unlike those previously made. Mr.
Barnes gave an embodiment of his invention to a woman friend, who later
became his wife. When the corsets in which the springs were used wore
the parties to whom the ... [invention was] given under any obligation of
secrecy"); see also Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265
(1986) (emphasizing that the inventor "at all times retained control over... [the
invention's] use as well as over the distribution of information concerning it"),
rev'd, 872 F.2d 407 (Fed. Cir. 1989); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.,
724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (articulating that the totality of the
circumstances test evaluates factors such as: (1) were records kept? (2) was anyone
besides the inventor conducting the experiments? (3) how many tests were
conducted? (4) how long was the test period?).
76See City of Elizabethv. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 133
(1877).
77Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
78 Id. at 336; see also Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 97 (1883) (stating that
although interior bolts used in safes were concealed, "[t]hey had no more
concealment than was inseparable from any legitimate use of them").
79See Egbert, 104 U.S. at 334.
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out, Mrs. Barnes ripped them open, took out the springs and reused them
in new corsets.
In 1863, Mr. Barnes showed an acquaintance, Mr. Sturgis, the corset
springs. Mr. Barnes requested that Mrs. Barnes take them off so he could
show them to Mr. Sturgis. Mrs. Barnes left the room, then returned and
ripped the corsets open and took out the springs. Mr. Barnes explained to
Mr. Sturgis the workings of the corset springs. The issue before the Court
was whether the aforementioned evidence reflected a public use within the
meaning of the statute."0
The Court stated that "whether the use of an invention is public or
private does not necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom
its use is known."' The key question is whether the inventor "gives or sells
. . . [the invention] to another, to be used... without limitation or
restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and [if] it is so used, such use is public,
even though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to one
person."8 2 In contrast, the Court noted that "a use necessarily open to public
view, if made in good faith solely to test the qualities of the invention, and
for the purpose of experiment, is not a public use within the meaning of the
statute.
83
The Court concluded that Mr. Barnes' use was a public one. He gave
two pairs of corset-steels, his invention, to Mrs. Barnes for her use. This
invention was given to her free of any restricted use. "He imposed no
obligation of secrecy, nor any condition or restriction whatever. They were
not presented for the purpose of experiment, nor to test their qualities. 84
The invention was complete at the time he gave her the gift. The record
showed that "[t]he inventor slept on his rights for eleven years."8" He
invented the corset-springs in 1855 and did not apply for a patent until
March 1866. During that time the invention found its way into general, if
not universal, use. 6 Having realized the value of his invention, Mr. Barnes
"attempted to resume, by his application, what by his acts he had clearly
dedicated to the public.
817
0 See id. at 335-36.81Id. at 336.
82 Id.




86 See id. ("A great part of the record is taken up with the testimony of the
manufacturers and venders [sic] of corset-steels, showing that before he applied for




The Court held that the inventor-had dedicated the invention to the
public since the invention had found its way into general use.8 Next, the
Court determined that there had been no experimentation because the
invention was complete. The invention was ready for patenting for over
eleven years, as the corset-springs worked for their intended purpose.
Further forfeiting his rights to the invention, the inventor was spurred into
filing only after he realized the value of his invention.8 9
Keeping in mind the crucial issues of dedication to the public and
detrimental public reliance, the Court decided Hall v. Macneale.9° In this
case, the invention covered an improvement in connecting doors and
casings of safes. Safes encompassing the patented invention were in use
and sold before the critical date. The patentee argued that the safes were
experimental andthe use for experimental purposes.91 The Court disagreed,
finding the use to be a public one. The Court emphasized that the workmeri
who installed the invention in the safes knew the invention's construction,
arrangement, purpose, and mode of operation. Further, the Court noted that
the invention was complete and there was no experimental use.92 The Court
said:
The invention was complete in those safes. It was capable of producing
the results sought to be accomplished.... The construction and arrange-
ment and purpose and mode of operation and use of the bolts in the safes
were necessarily known to the workmen who put them in. They were, it
is true, hidden from view, after the safes were completed, and it required
a destruction of the safes to bring them into view. But this was no
concealment of them or use of them in secret. They had no more
concealment than was inseparable from any legitimate use of them. As to
the use being experimental, it is not shown that any attempt was made to
see if the plates of the safes could be stripped off, and thus to prove
whether or not conical bolts [the invention] were efficient. The safes were
sold, and, apparently, no experiment and no experimental use were
thought to be necessary. The idea of a use for experiment was an
afterthought An invention of the kind might be in use and no burglarious
attempt be ever made to enter the safe, and it might be said that the use of
88 See id.
89 See supra note 20. See also 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (specifically ad-
dressing spurring).90Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90 (1883).
91 See id.
'2 See id. at 97.
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the invention was always experimental until the burglarious attempt
should be made, and so the use would never be other than experimental. 93
Because the only legitimate use of the safes would always conceal the
invention, the patentees were unable to argue the use was not public. In
arguing that the safes were experimental, the patentees said that they did
not know if these bolts would hold during a burglary. The Court said that
any use of the safes would not be considered experimental until an attempt
to burglarize them was made. The Court found that all legitimate uses of
an invention could not be considered experimental, especially without
evidence of experimentation. 4
Although the invention was somewhat hidden from public view, it was
not concealed from the workmen who installed the invention into the safes.
This is unlike City ofElizabeth,95 where the inventor installed the invention
himself. Disclosure to the workmen is evidence of forfeiture or dedication
ofthe invention to the public. Because the workmen were skilled in the art,
it is also possible there was some detrimental reliance that the invention
was in the public domain. The Court did not delve into this issue, as they
found there had been a commercial sale. invalidating the patent. The Court
determined that because the invention worked for its intended purpose, the
use was not experimental.96 In other words, the invention was ready for
patenting.
In Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague,97 the invention at
issue covered improvements in machines for making buckle-levers. The
patentee, Sprague, had the invention in use before the critical date. He
produced about 50,000 levers used on buckles from his machines and sold
them in the market. The workmen in his business operated the machines.9
The public was able to view the machine's operation "either for the purpose
of selling material for the manufacture or of purchasing its product." 99
Sprague claimedthat the use was for experimental purposes only, as he was
trying to perfect his machine. In fact, within the grace period, he incorpo-
rated improvements to the machine into three additional patent claims. °°
931d.
94 See id.
9 City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
96 See id.
' Smith & Griggs Mfg. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887).
9' See id. at 254.
99 Id.
oo See id. at 250.
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In Smith & Griggs, however, the invention did not consist of the entire
machine, which was being improved. The Court said the invention was not
a unit, because it was not one that consisted of the entire machine as
ultimately constructed and operated. The Court stated:
Here the invention is not one, but many; each of the claims in both of the
patents is for a specific combination in a practically successful machine
for making buckle-levers, and each is a separate and distinct invention,
and claimed as such.... [H]e did so use [the invention] for profit in the
ordinary course and conduct of his business, and for the purpose of a
successful prosecution of that business, it can hardly be said with
propriety that such use was merely experimental .... 101
Because the invention was not over the entire machine, the experimentation
did not prevent the on sale bar to patentability. Although decided as a
public use case, the Court looked at the case in terms of the policies
underlying the on-sale bar, such as prohibiting commercial exploitation of
the invention beyond the statutorily prescribed period. The Court found the
use to be "mainly for the purposes of trade and profit, and the experiment
... [was] merely incidental."' 02 The use of the machine was for the purpose
of "conduct[ing] the business of the manufacture, the improvement and
perfection of the machine being merely incidental and subsidiary."'03
Taking into consideration the policies underlying the public usebar, the
inventor forfeited or dedicated his invention to the public by allowing the
public to view the machine's operation for the purpose of commercializing
the invention." Such viewing could also lead to the public's detrimental
reliance that the invention was in the public domain, absent a confidential-
ity agfeement. Those who are viewing for the purpose of selling or
purchasing the invention are those skilled in the art who have interest in
using the invention without restriction.
International Tooth-Crown Co. v. Gaylord'05 involved an invention for
an artificial denture placed upon the root of a partially destroyed tooth. The
patentee, Dr. Richmond, taught a great number of dentists around the
country how to work his invention. At no time did he indicate he was
experimenting with the invention. He received compensation for all of his
01 Id. at 256.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 266.
104 See id. at 254.
" International Tooth-Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U.S. 55 (1891).
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instruction. Consequently, the Court foundthat his use was not experimen-
tal.1°6 The Court noted, "[i]n... light of... [the facts] we are compelled
to hold that ... [the use] constituted such an abandonment of his...
[invention] as to preclude his obtaining a valid patent for it."' 7 In this case,
there was a commercial sale of the invention to dentists throughout the
country. The invention was forfeited or dedicated to the public because Dr.
Richmond taught the invention to those skilled in the art without restric-
tion. Because of his widespread use of the invention around the country
before those skilled in the art, the invention made its way into universal or
general use. The Court said:
If, as was said in Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright and Egbert v.
Lipprnann, a single instance of sale or of use by the patentee may be fatal
to the patent, much more is this so where the patentee publicly performs
an operation covered by his patent in a dozen different cities throughout
the country, and teaches it to other members of the profession, who adopt
it as a recognized feature of their practice.1
0 9
Such widespread use of the invention evidenced that the public detrimen-
tally relied on the invention being part of the public domain and available
for general and universal use.
Note that in all of the cases evaluated in Part II, the Supreme Court
focused on the policy issues underlying the public use and on sale bars in
deciding whether an invention was on sale or in public use. The Court
highlighted whether the invention had been forfeited or dedicated to the
public, whether there had been detrimental reliance, or whether the
invention had been commercialized, thus extending the monopoly beyond
the statutory period. In the context of that inquiry, the Court evaluated
whether the use or sale was primarily for experimental purposes. The Court
did not always concretely separate these issues from one another. Despite
this, the Court was able to reach the appropriate outcome, because it did not
lose sight of the underlying policies encompassing the public use and on
sale bars. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not followed the Supreme
Court's approach of devoting attention to the crucial underlying policies of
the public use and on sale bars, notwithstanding claims to the contrary. The
Federal Circuit has utilized a totality of the circumstances approach in
10 See id. at 55, 62.
107 Id. at.64.




analyzing these cases. It is a policy approach tending to focus on whether
a use or sale is for experimental purposes, rather than whether or not the
use is public or the sale is commercial. The totality of the circumstances
test is a policy approach that the Federal Circuit has treated as if it were a
legal rule.
In the following section, the totality of the circumstances test is.
examined. Instead of continuing with this policy approach, public use and
on sale issues should be put in terms of a legal rule that would provide
clarity and predictability to the cases. The rule in Pfaffand the proposed
rule serve this purpose.
III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
IN PUBLIC USE AND ON SALE CASES
The Federal Circuit has used the totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether a public use or on sale bar has occurred under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102.110 The Federal Circuit has adopted the following underlying policies
in applying the totality of the circumstances test: (1) discouraging the
removal, from the public domain, of inventions that the public reasonably
has come to believe are freely available; (2) favoring the "prompt and
widespread disclosure of new inventions"; '11 (3) allowing the inventor a
reasonable amount of time following sales activity to determine the
potential economic value of a patent; and (4) prohibiting the inventor from
commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater than the
statutorily prescribedtime." 2 "To give effect to the underlying policies, the
court will want to consider the totality of circumstances relating to the
character and extent of commercial activities, the type of invention and its
stage of development.., along with the character and extent of bona fide
experimentation.'"
3
The purpose of the on sale bar is to prevent inventors from exploiting
the commercial value of their inventions while deferring the beginning of
11 See infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text. In Pfaff, however, the
Supreme Court eliminated the totality of circumstances test for the on sale bar
issue. See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304, 311-12 (1998).
' General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
"
2 See id.; see also In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985); King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
Landry, supra note 31, at 1163-69.
113 Western Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
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the statutory term.1 4 In order to start the statutory bar clock running, it is
necessary to determine when a sale or offer to sell has occurred. At first
this may sound simple, but the timing of when a sale has occurred is
precisely what has made the totality of the circumstances test unreasonably
vague for on sale cases. Can an invention be sold or offered for sale if the
invention has not been reduced to practice? In other words, is it necessary
that there be an actual epitome of the invention, which includes all the
patent claims, in order for there to be a sale 15
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit has "expressly rejected the notion that
a physical embodiment is always required""' 6 in determining whether a sale
has occurred. The court in UMC Electronics Co. v. United States' 7 stated
that "reduction to practice of the claimed invention has not been and should
not be made an absolute requirement of the on-sale bar."" 8 This ruling,
however, did not provide concrete guidance to give notice as to when a sale
has occurred.
In 1997, the Federal Circuit decided Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc."19
and articulated that the proper question in addressing on sale issues "is
whether the invention was substantially complete at the time of sale such
that there was 'reason to expect that it would work for its intended purpose
upon completion.' "'20 This ruling continued the confusion and uncertainty
in resolving when an invention has been on sale or offered for sale. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pfaff for two reasons:12' "[(1)]
[b]ecause other courts have held or assumedthat an invention cannot be'on
sale' within the meaning of § 102(b) unless and until it has been reduced
to practice and [(2)] because the text of § 102(b) makes no reference to
'substantial completion' of an invention."''
"4 See Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc.,
141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Ferag AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562,
1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
" 5 See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(defining reduction to practice to mean that there must be "a physical embodiment
[of the invention] which includes all limitations of the claim").
116 Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 837
(Fed. Cir. 1984)), aff'd 119 S. Ct. 304 (1998).
117 UMCElecs., 816 F.2d at 647.
118 Id. at 656.
"9 Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1429.
2OId. at 1434 (quoting Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d
1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
1 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
' Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304,308 (1998) (citations omitted).
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InPfaff, the Supreme Court eliminated the totality of the circumstances
test for on sale bar analysis and created a general rule of law to define when
a sale has occurred under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Court stated that the "on-
sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date
[1] the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale... [2]
[t]he invention must be ready for patenting."'" The second prong:
may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice
before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the
inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that
were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice
the invention.'
24
In public use cases, the totality of the circumstances test becomes
confusing in determining whether or not a use is based on an experimental
use. Even though experimental use is reputed to be a negation of public
use, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has occasionally
applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine if a use is
experimental. 2 5 This, in essence, treats experimental use as if it were an
exception to the public use bar with distinct criteria, rather than a public
use negation.126 This has caused the courts to reach inconsistent results,
intensifying the criticism that all of the circumstances tests are "unneces-
sarily vague."'"
2 Id. at 311-12.
124 Id. at 312.
125 Note that 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) does not make reference to the phrase
"experimental use." Public use is the issue evaluated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
This is similar to what the Supreme Court said in Pfaff in granting certiorari:
"because the text of § 102(b) makes no reference to 'substantial completion of an
invention."' Id. at 308.
126 To determine whether ause is experimental these objective indicia have been
analyzed:
the number of prototypes and the duration of testing, whether records or
progress reports were made concerning the testing, the existence of a
secrecy agreement between the patentee and the party performing the
testing, whether the patentee received compensation for the use of the
invention, and the extent ofcontrol the inventor maintained over the testing.
Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
127 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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What is the significance between experimental use as a negation to
public use versus an exception to public use? In essence, the Federal
Circuit answered this question in TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional
Positioners, Inc." In this case, orthodontists tested tooth-positioners on
patients for several years. Each use occurred prior to the critical date. The
orthodontists kept records of the tests and did not specifically charge their
patients for implanting the positioners. The patentees, TP Laboratories,
sued competitors, Professional Positioners, for infringement. In their
defense, the alleged infringers argued the use was public, invalidating the
patent.
29
The trial court found that the use was public. 130 The Federal Circuit
criticized the trial court's method of concluding that the use was public.1
3'
The trial court put the burden on the patent owner to prove that a public use
was experimental. 32 The Federal Circuit, in its analysis, introducedthe idea
that there is only one inquiry when determining whether there has been a
public use:
[I]t is incorrect to impose on the patent owner, as the trial court in this
case did, the burden of proving that a "public use" was "experimental."
These are not two separable issues. It is incorrect to ask: "Was it public
use?" and then, "Was it experimental?" Rather, the court is faced with a
single issue: Was it public use under § 102(b)?
... This does not mean, of course, that the challenger has the burden
of proving that the use is not experimental. Nor does it mean that the
patent owner is relieved of explanation. It means that if aprimafacie case
is made of public use, the patent owner must be able to point to or must
come forward with convincing evidence to counter that showing.
33
The Federal Circuit said the trial court should have looked at all of the
evidence in its entirety and decided whether it led to the conclusion there
had been a public use.' Thus, the test is whether the evidence, in its
entirety, leads to the conclusion that a public use occurred.
In applying this test, the Federal Circuit found that disclosure of the
positioner could not be avoided in any testing. Although there were no
" TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
"2
9 See id. at 966-68.
'30 See id. at 966.
'3' See id. at 971.
132 See id.




confidentiality agreements made between orthodontist and patient, the
court implied confidentiality from the dentist-patient relationship. Nothing
in the use was inconsistent with experimentation. 3' A routine checkup
"does not indicate the inventors lack of control or abandonment to the
public."
136
The court discussed the on sale issue separately, noting that no
positioners covered by the patent were sold to competing dentists. The
inventor did not charge his patients extra for the improved positioners.1
37
"No commercial exploitation having been made to even a small degree
prior to filing the patent application, the underlying policy of prohibiting
an extension of the term is clearly not offended in this respect.'
3 8
The Federal Circuit found that none of the policies underlying the
public use bar had been violated. The uses were not secret but the invention
was not abandoned to the public. There was no evidence that given the use,
the invention found its way into universal or general use, thus dedicating
the invention to the public. The inventors sold the positioners to the
patients. The invention, however, was not ready for patenting as the
positioners were being tested through the critical date.
1 39
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF A POLICY APPROACH TO LEGAL
ANALYSIS USING TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TESTS
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an essay discussing the
perils in utilizing totality of the circumstances tests too readily as a
mechanism for finding justice.Y It explores the "dichotomy between the
'general rule of law' and 'personal discretion to do justice.""" Giving
judges the personal discretion to do justice often appears to create
flexibility in a statutory framework that seems too rigid to dispense justice.
However, he notes that judges' decisions should not be overrated. 2 There
are competing values in finding the "perfect" answer, one of which is the
appearance of equal treatment. 3 Justice Scalia observes:
135 See id. at 972.
136 Id.
137 See id. at 972-73.
138 Id. at 973.
139 See id.
14 See Scalia, supra note 7.
141 Id. at 1176.
142 See id. at 1178.
143 See id.
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[T]he trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law
making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well. When a
case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important,
if the system of'justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be
different, but that it be seen to be so. When one is dealing, as... [the
Supreme] Court often is, with issues so heartfelt that they are believed by
one side or the other to be resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not
greatly appeal to one's sense ofjustice to say: "Well, that earlier case had
nine factors, this one has nine plus one." Much better, even at the expense
of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to
have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explana-
tion of the decision.144
Moreover, the discretion-conferring approach can lead to unpredictability,
not only within the Court, but also at the trial court level and intermediate
appellate levels. Justice Scalia further states:
The fact is that when we decide a case on the basis of what we have come
to call the 'totality of the circumstances' test, it is not we who will be
'closing in on the law' in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen
different courts of appeals-or, if it is a federal issue that can arise in state
court litigation as well, thirteen different courts of appeals and fifty state
supreme courts. To adopt such an approach, in other words, is effectively
to conclude that uniformity is not a particularly important objective with
respect to the legal question at issue.
145
Although appeals in patent cases go directlyto the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and not to the various regional circuits,146 Justice
Scalia's point is appropriate for patent cases as well. The Federal Circuit
was created in order to bring uniformity and predictability to the patent
law. 147 Without more discrete rules, this predictability anduniformity ofthe
patent law will be difficult to attain.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1179.
146 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
141 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25; see also South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982)
(reciting that the Federal Circuit Court was "created and chartered with the hope




The idea behind finding a general rule of law applicable to all
situations is philosophically viable, but often difficult to apply in practice.
How does one articulate a suitable general rule for determining whether an
invention is in the public use within § 102(b), without resorting to a totality
of the circumstances test? Justice Scalia notes that it is perhaps easier for
him than it is for some judges to develop general rules in this area, as he
adheres closely to the plain meaning of the text." Justice Scalia states that
the difficulty in creating general rules stems not only from the nature ofthe
subject matter in general, but also from the limited scope of materials
judges may consult. Judges must find some basis for framing these general
rules out of the text of a statute or that which the Constitution provides. 49
Justice Scalia, however, suggests that "[ilt is rare, however, that even the
most vague and general text cannot be given some precise, principled
content-and that is indeed the essence of the judicial craft .... The trick
is to carry general principle as far as it can go in substantial furtherance of
the precise statutory or constitutional prescription."'50
In Pfaff, the Supreme Court created a general rule of law to define
when a sale has occurred under § 102(b). The rule has two prongs: (1) "the
148 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 1184. Justice Scalia formulates an example of his
method of interpretation versus that of his colleagues in the case Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). In Chesternut, the issue was whether adefendant
had been "seized" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The defendant was
running away from a police car. Initially, the car followed, but then drove
alongside him. As the car was beside him, the defendant dropped a packet of illegal
drugs which was recovered by the police. If these events amounted to a seizure, and
"if probable cause was lacking, the evidence was inadmissible and the conviction
for unlawful possession would have to be reversed." Scalia, supra note 7, at 1184.
The Court, in deciding the case, applied the following test: "whether aperson in the
defendant's position would have felt that he was free to disregard the police and go
about his business." Id. Although not a totality of the circumstances test, it
specifically held neither "a chase without a stop was a seizure [nor] ... a chase
without a stop could not be a seizure." Id. Justice Scalia suggested that making
these determinations could have made the law more precise than the reasonable
person standard used in the majority opinion. See id.
49 See Scalia, supra note 7, at 1182-83.
150 Id. at 1183. Justice Scalia gives the example of the Sherman Act's vague
language prohibiting "contract[s], combination[s] ... or conspirac[ies] in restraint
of trade." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990)). Even though this language is vague, the
Court has not required there to be a totality of the circumstances test in every case.
The Court's general "test for per se Sherman Act illegality.., is whether the type
of conduct in question 'would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
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product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale;" ' and (2) "the
invention must be ready for patenting." ' The second prong may be
satisfied "by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by
proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or
other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable
a person skilled in the 'art to practice the invention." '
The Court came to this rule through looking at the historical origins of
the patent system:
[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages
both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time. The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one
hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle
competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws
since their inception.15
The Court noted that § 102 is a limiting provision, consistent with
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. 55 Section 102
excludes "ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection and
confine[s] the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term."' 156 The
idea is to encourage invention in exchange for a government granted
monopoly presented to the patent owner for a limited period of time. 5 7 In
exchange for this temporary monopoly, the patent owner must publicly
'51Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct 304,311-12 (1998).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 312.
1'4Id. at310.
" Id. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
116 Pfaff, 119 S. Ct at 310 (citing Frantz Mfg. v. Phoenix Mfg., 457 F.2d 314,
320 (7th Cir. 1972)).
15' The patent grant "shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for patent
was filed in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). The patent owner
gains a right to exclude others from "making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States." Id. § 154(a)(1).
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disclose the substance of his or her invention. Such disclosure effectively
dedicates the invention to the public after the patent term has ended,
thereby benefiting society and furthering its knowledge. As such, the
governmental power to grant this monopoly reflects a balance between
encouraging innovation and avoiding competition-stifling monopolies
having no contemporaneous purpose in advancing '"the Progress of Science
and useful Arts." '
However, if the idea is to encourage invention, it is important that
inventors know what activities will forfeit their rights to patent their
inventions. As the PfaffCourt found, certainty is needed to provide these
inventors with a definite standard in determining when a patent application
must be filed in order to serve the proper notice function of the statute.
159
The Court iterated that the totality of the circumstances test "undermine[d]
the interest in certainty"'6 ° in determining when an invention was on sale
for § 102(b) purposes.
In continuing its search for a general rule of law, the Court ex-
amined the word "invention" in the context of§ 102. The Court concluded
"invention must refer to a concept that is complete, rather than merely
one that is 'substantially complete.' "161 Determining what is "sub-
stantially complete" is too vague. 62 Although "reduction to practice
ordinarily provides the best evidence that an invention is complete... it
does not follow that proof of reduction to practice is necessary in every
case."'1
63
In Pfaff, the Court reviewed several of the early Supreme Court cases.
According to the Court, these cases couldbe best understood as "indicating
that the invention's reduction to practice demonstratedthat the concept was
no longer in an experimental phase."''1 Thereafter, the Court enumerated
the following test to determine when the on-sale bar applies: (1) when the
product is the subject of a commercial sale; and (2) when the invention is
ready for patenting. 165
, Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
19 See Pfaff, 119 S. Ct at 311.
160 Id.
161 See id.; see also Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 1434 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (finding the appropriate question to be whether the invention was sub-
stantially complete at the time of sale such that there was "reason to expect that it
would work for its intended purpose upon completion").
'62SeePfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 311.
1631Id.
164Id. at311 n.12.
165 See id. at 311-12.
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In a sense, the Court is applying a "constructive reduction to practice"
standard'66 when it says the invention must be ready for patenting. If the
inventor prepares enough descriptions of the invention so that he or she
could have constructively reduced the invention to practice by filing an
application in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the invention is ready
for patenting under Pfaff.67
Because of the Supreme Court's concern inPfafffor creating a definite
standard for determining when a patent application must be filed, it follows
that the same concern must exist for when an invention is in public use
under § 102. Currently, the case law still applies the totality of the
circumstances test with respect to this issue.'68 Yet, it seems inconsistent
to continue to apply this test to public use issues. Engaging in frequent
totality of the circumstances tests makes judges fact-finders rather than
determiners of law. 69 "[W]hen an appellate judge comes up with nothing
better than a totality of the circumstances test to explain his decision, he is
not so much pronouncing the law in the normal sense as engaging in the
less exalted function of fact-finding."' 70
" Constructive reduction to practice occurs when a patent application is filed.
See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The general
requirements for filing a patent application are set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.51. An
application must include, inter alia, a specification enabling one of skill in the art
to practice the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975). Drawings, if appropriate,
should be submitted along with an oath or declaration that the applicants believe
they are the original inventors. See id.
167 See In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that the
constructive reduction to practice date is a benefit as long as the application is not
abandoned:
While the filing of the original application theoretically constituted a
constructive reduction to practice at the time, the subsequent abandonment
of that application also resulted in an abandonment of the benefit of that
filing as a constructive reduction to practice. The filing of the original
application is, however, evidence of conception of the invention.).
Id.
161 See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323
& n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1119
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266
(Fed. Cir. 1986); TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965,972
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting that the "decision on whether there has been a 'public
use' can only be made upon consideration of the entire surrounding circum-
stances").




If judges want to make issues questions of law, perhaps it would be
better to create general rules of law and be law determiners rather than to
create more totality of the circumstances tests and function as prestigious
fact-finders.' 71
V. A PROPOSED GENERAL RULE OF LAW
TEST TO DETERMINE PUBLIC USE AFTER PFAFF
Because the on sale and public use bars have been analyzed in
combination, it is necessary to eliminate the current totality of the
circumstances test used to determine whether there has been a public use
in violation of § 102(b). Not only has the analysis inappropriately focused
on whether the use is experimental rather than public, the test may be
unreasonably vague. A general rule of law test that is more concrete than
the totality of the circumstances test is one that parallels the rule articulated
in Pfaffi (1) the invention must be dedicated to the public or there must be
detrimental public reliance that the invention is in the public domain; and
(2) the invention must be ready for patenting. 1 2 The first prong of the test
remains true to the older Supreme Court cases that focused on the crucial
171 See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (1996), reh'g en banc denied,
103 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J., concurring).
The dissents from the decision not to take the case en banc argue that
public use is a question of fact, not law, and that the panel erred in failing
to defer to the jury's decision of public use....
We have for some time considered the question of public use under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) to be a question of law.... The reason it is a question of
law is that it is a statutory term that requires the exercise of judgment,
taking into account a variety of facts in light of the policies behind the
statute. Public use is not a matter of simply determining whether, e.g., a
particular event occurred more than one year from the filing date of an
application, a matter capable of precise determination. It encompasses
underlying facts such as whether the action in question was undertaken for
commercial purposes, whether members of the public viewed the invention
without any bond of confidentiality to the inventor, whether the nature of
the invention was discernible by observation, whether any precautions were
taken to exclude outsiders, etc. These facts, determinable by a fact-finder
and of course subject to deference, must be weighed in making ajudgment
whether they amount to the type of action that the statute was intended by
Congress to prohibit
Id.
" See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304, 311-12 (1998).
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underlying principles behind the public use bar. The second prong
preserves the experimental use doctrine because it takes into account
experimentation. If the use is purely experimental, the invention is not
ready for patenting. As such, if there were sufficient experimentation, there
would be no public use under § 102(b). In addition, this proposed rule
meets the goal of the Supreme Court in Pfaff, which is to provide a
"definite standard in determining when a patent application must be
filed' r73 in order to serve the proper notice function of § 102(b).
While preserving the experimental use doctrine's effects, the proposed
test properly focuses on whether or not the use is a public one rather than
whether or not the use is experimental. In other words, the question should
be whether the invention has been forfeited or dedicated to the public or
whether the public detrimentally relied on the invention being in the public
domain. After analyzing the early Supreme Court opinions discussed in
Part II and other opinions written by Supreme Court Justices sitting by
designation in district courts, the purposes behind the public use bar lead
to this conclusion. 74 An inexhaustive list of factors indicating whether or
173 Id. at311.
"7' See Mellus v. Silsbee, 16 F. Cas. 1332, 1334 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No.
9,404). Supreme Court Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, charged the jury:
I am clearly of the opinion, that if the inventor dedicates his invention to the
public, he cannot afterwards resume it, or claim an exclusive right in it. It
is like the dedication of a public way, or other public easement. The
question, in such cases, is a question of fact. Has he so dedicated it? I agree
his acts are to be construed liberally; that he is not to be estopped by
licensing a few persons to use his invention to ascertain its utility, orby any
such acts ofpeculiar indulgence and use, as may fairly consist with the clear
intention to hold the exclusive privilege. But if the inventor proclaims his
intention to all the world, and suffers it to go into general and public use,
without objection; if he asserts no exclusive right for years, with a full
knowledge that the public are led by it to a general use, such conduct, in my
judgment amounts to strong proof, that he waives the exclusive right, and
dedicates the invention to the world. After such conduct, the attempt to
regain the exclusive right, and secure it by a patent, would operate as a
fraud upon the public; and would hold out inducements to incur heavy
expenses in putting inventions into operation, of which the party might be
deprived at the mere will or caprice of the inventor.
Id. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23-24 (1829):
[W]e are all of opinion, that the true construction of the act is, that the first
inventor cannot acquire a good title to a patent; if he suffers the thing
invented to go into public use, or to be publicly sold for use, before he
makes application for a patent. His voluntary act or acquiescence in the
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not a use has been dedicated to the public includes: (1) whether the
invention is in general or universal use; (2) whether the inventor's delay in
filing, beyond the statutory period, has dedicated the invention to the public
or allowed the public to have detrimentally relied that the invention is in
the public domain; and (3) whether those skilled in the art have had access
to the use. If those skilled in the art have had access to the use, this
increases the likelihood of detrimental public reliance.
The proposed test is less vague than the current totality of the
circumstances test. There is still room, however, for judicial interpretation.
For example, determining whether the invention has been dedicated to the
public or whether there has been detrimental public reliance still leaves
room for judicial discretion. This flexibility, however, is probably no more
prevalent here than in the on sale rule enumerated in Pfaff. The Pfafftest
requires the fact-finder to determine when an invention has been subject to
public sale and use is an abandonment of his right; or rather creates a
disability to comply with the terms and conditions on which alone the
secretary of state is authorized to grant him a patent
Id. See Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833):
The patent law was designed for public benefit, as well as for the benefit of
inventors.... [I]t was not the intention of this law, to take from the public,
that of which they were fairly in possession....
... And it would be extremely impolitic, to retard or embarrass this
advance, by withdrawing from the public any useful invention or art, and
making it a subject of private monopoly.
No matter by what means an invention may be communicated to the
public, before a patent is obtained; any acquiescence in the public use, by
the inventor, will be an abandonment of his right...
The invention passes to the possession of innocent persons, who... [,]
at a considerable expense, perhaps.., appropriate it to their own use.
Id. See Ryan v. Goodwin, 21 F. Cas. 110, 111-12 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 12,
186). Justice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, instructed the jury:
If the use.., be merely experimental, to ascertain the value or utility, or
success of the invention, by putting it in practice, that is not such a use, as
will deprive the inventor of his title .... A sale or use of [the invention].
.. in the intermediate time between the application for a patent and a grant
thereof... [is not a public use]. It furnishes no foundation to presume, that
the inventor means to abandon his invention to the public; and does not,
because it is not within the words of... [the Patent Act], create any statute
disability to assert his right to a patent
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a commercial sale. 75 However, this discretion is necessary, unlike the
vagueness in the current totality of the circumstances test.
To address some uncertainties inPfaff, it is more pragmatic to holdthat
all sales or offers for sale are commercial. It may be difficult to determine
where an experimental sale starts and when the commercial sale begins.
True experiments could be protected in the second prong of the Pfafftest,
which states that the invention must be ready for patenting. If the invention
is truly in an experimental phase, it will not be ready for patenting. Thus,
the second prong of the Pfafftest will not be met. That is to say, there will
be no "proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or... proof
that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other
descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a
person skilled in the art to practice the invention."'76
The same is true for the proposed test for public use. The invention
must be ready for patenting. One difference between evaluating a
commercial sale versus a public use is that there needs to be some
recognition that a reasonable evaluation period is needed to experiment on
an invention. This evaluation period should be tied to what a person of
ordinary skill would think a reasonable evaluation period is for the art in
question. One other concern must be noted. If the inventor does not change
anything after the evaluation period, it may appear that no experimentation
occurred. To rectify this problem, it is necessary to look at the art in
question and determine whether the delay was reasonable. The answer will
vary depending on the type of invention.
VI. FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES EXAMINED
A. Cases Commingling Commercialization and Public Use Analysis
In Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., r the Federal Circuit
appropriately asked whether there was a public use of the invention, rather
than whether the use was experimental. In Moleculon, Larry Nichols
conceived of a cube puzzle composed of "eight cubes attached in a 2 x 2 x
2 arrangement, with each of the six faces of the composite cube distin-
guished by a different color and the individual cubes being capable of
rotation in sets of four around one of three mutually perpendicular axes.' 17 8
'"5 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
176 Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 312 (footnote omitted).
'77 Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
171 Id. at 1263.
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From 1957 to 1962, Nichols constructed paper models of his idea. He
showed these models to a few close friends, "including two roommates
and a colleague in the chemistry department."1 9 The puzzles were
located in Nichols' room and he "explained its operation to at least one of
them."180
In 1962, Nichols began to work as a research scientist at Moleculon. In
1968, Nichols constructed a wood block prototype of his cube puzzle.
Generally, he kept his invention at home, but occasionally he brought it to
his office. In January 1969, the president of Moleculon, Dr. Obermayer,
saw the model on Nichols' desk. Dr. Obermayer expressed interest in
commercializing the puzzle, although Nichols had not intended to do so. In
March 1969, Nichols assigned to Moleculon all his rights to the puzzle in
return for a share of potential proceeds gained from commercialization.
After the critical date, Moleculon contacted approximately fifty to sixty
game manufacturers. Despite its efforts, Moleculon did not succeed in
marketing Nichols' cube.18 Moleculon did, however, file a patent
application covering Nichols' cube on March 3, 1970. This patent issued
on April 11, 1972, as U.S. Patent No. 3,655,201 (the '201 patent).
82
The devices accused of infiinging the '201 patent were various
renditions of the Rubik's cube puzzle. As a defense to infringement, the
defendant, CBS, alleged Nichols placed the subject invention in "public
use" and "on sale" before the March 3, 1969 critical date, thus rendering
the patent invalid under § 102(b). CBS characterizedNichols' showing the
model of his invention to his colleagues, without any confidentiality
restrictions, as a public use. Moreover, CBS surmised Obermayer's use as
purely commercial, creating a statutory bar to patenting.
183
The Federal Circuit disagreed with CBS, finding that Nichols' use was
for his own private use, not a public use. 84 The court quoted from the trial
court's opinion in making its determination:
The essence of 'public use' is the free and unrestricted giving over of an
invention to a member of the public or the public in general. What I see
here, by contrast, is the inventor's private use of his own invention for his





' See id. at 1265.
184 See id.
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... He never used the puzzle or permitted it used in a place or a time
when he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy and ofconfiden-
tiality.
... None of those participants had any basis for inferring that the
puzzle was being given over by Nichols for their free and unrestricted use.
Holding the public use bar inapplicable in these circumstances will not
remove anything from the public domain.
81
The Federal Circuit, however, in continuing its public use analysis,
evaluated whether any commercially motivated activity occurred. This
analysis would be more properly introduced under the on sale bar
analysis.'86 The court stated that "there is absolutely no evidence in this
case of commercially motivated activity by Nichols during the relevant
period. Accordingly, the underlying policy against extending the effective
term of exclusivity is not offended by a finding that the Nichols invention
was not in public use."'87 The court also mentioned that a "[d]iscussion
between employer and employee does not by itself convert an employee's
private pursuit into commercial enterprise with the employer."'18
1. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. Was the invention a subject of a commercial
sale before the critical date? No. CBS argued that the claimed invention
was on sale under § 102(b) because Nichols agreed orally to assign his
patent rights in the invention to Moleculon prior to the critical date. 89 The
"5 Id. at 1265-66 (emphasis added).
"6 See id. at 1267. The court looks at the on sale bar issue in an unusual context.
CBS argued that the claimed invention was on sale under § 102(b) because Nichols
agreed, orally, to assign his patent rights in the invention to Moleculon prior to the
critical date. The court found that the assignment of patent rights to an invention
is not a sale of "the invention" under § 102(b). See id. (citing United States Elec.
Light Co. v. Consolidated Elec. Light Co., 33 F. 869, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1888);
Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1051, 1075 (D. Del.
1984); see also Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta Operations, 357 F.
Supp. 1222, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
..7 Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d at 1266.
188 Id. at 1267.
"I See id. at 1266-67.
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court found that the assignment of patent rights to an invention "is not a
sale of 'the invention' within the meaning of section 102(b)." 190 Actual
commercialization of the invention did not occur until after the critical
date. 191
b. Public Use Analysis
The policy behind the public use bar is to prevent what has been
dedicated to the public or detrimentally relied on by the public as being in
the public domain from becoming part of a patent monopoly. Was there a
public use of the invention? Using the proposed test for public use,
Moleculon probably would have been decided the same way. The court in
Moleculon carefully asked whether the use was public or private. The court
noted that what it saw was the inventor's private use of his own invention
for his own enjoyment. Those who saw the invention were the inventor's
friends and colleagues who were not likelyto and didnot detrimentally rely
on the invention being in the public domain. Those who knew of the
invention, before the critical date, were not those of skill in the art who
could take the invention and put it into universal or general use. The use
was one that did not remove anything from the public domain. Even though
the invention was ready for patenting, because the use was private, the
public use bar would be inapplicable. 192
In Harrington Manufacturingv. PowellManufacturing,193 the invention
was a mechanized tobacco harvester able to accommodate dog-legged or
out-of-line tobacco stalks. Before the critical date, one of the inventors,
Pickett, contacted several people skilled in the art and showed them how
the invention worked. He showed the invention to the president of the
defendant's company, a leading agricultural journalist, and two professors
who had attempted to build a mechanized tobacco harvester.I94 Also, prior
to the critical date, thejoumalist published an article discussing and giving
a price for the harvester.
The inventors argued that their use of the invention before the critical
date was experimental. Tobacco leaves ripen from the bottom of the stalk
upward. Therefore, when the invention was shown prior to the critical date,
190 Id. at 1267.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 1266.
'93Harrington Mfg. v. Powell Mfg., 815 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
19 Harrington Mfg. v. Powell Mfg., 623 F. Supp. 872, 874 (E.D.N.C.), affid
815 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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it had not yet been tested on the lower leaves because those leaves had been
previously harvested by a different machine. It was not until after the
critical date, when the harvester was tested on the lower leaves, that the
invention was finally reduced to practice. 195
The Federal Circuit used the totality of the circumstances test to
evaluate whether there was a public use. First, the court noted that there
were no secrecy agreements regarding those who had seen the invention
used prior to the critical date. The court noted that secrecy was the opposite
of what was sought, since a journalist was contacted." Next, the court
focused on the commercial motive attributed to contacting the journalist,
Osborne:
[One of the inventors] obviously demonstrated the harvester to [a
journalist,] Osborne[,] in order to gain public recognition. In the
newspaper article, Osborne not only reported that the harvester flawlessly
defoliated the tobacco leaves, but even published an approximate cost of
the harvester. This is a clear indication ofPickett's commercial motive.197
Instead of analyzing the public use issue separately, the commercial
motive/on sale inquiry is commingled in the analysis. The court does not
discuss whether it considered the quote of a price for the harvester in a
newspaper to be an offer for sale. Such an act flies in the face of the
primary policy of the on sale bar, to prevent the extension of a patent
monopoly beyond the statutory period.
The court stated that there was no public necessity in requiring the
inventor to demonstrate the harvester prior to the critical date. 98 The court,
however, does not discuss how showing the harvester to a competitor, an
agricultural reporter, and professors in the art could lead to the invention
being forfeited or dedicated to the public. In particular, the competitor who
was shown the invention built an allegedly infringing harvester that was the
basis of the infringement suit.199 This may be evidence of detrimental
reliance on the part of the competitor that the invention was in the public
domain.
Finally, the court looked at the experimental use issue. The court noted
that the prototype shown before the critical date fell within the scope ofthe
195 SeeHarringon, 815 F.2d at 1480.
196 See id. at 1480-81.
197Id. at 1481.
198 See id.
199 See Harrington, 623 F. Supp. at 873-74.
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relevant claim of the patent. That claim did not require that the lower
leaves of the tobacco be harvested.2" Thus, the argument that the harvester
needed to be tested to perfect the claimed invention failed.
2. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
In Harrington, different questions would have been asked under both
Pfaff and the proposed test.
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. Was the invention a subject of a commercial
sale before the critical date? Probably. The court did not evaluate whether
there was an offer for sale in the newspaper article."' This would have to
be analyzed under Pfaffto satisfy the first prong of the proposed test.
Was the invention ready for patenting? Yes. It was actually reduced to
practice. The patent claim in dispute did not require that the lower leaves
of the tobacco stalk be harvested. Thus, the argument concerning needing
time to harvest the lower leaves was irrelevant. The experimental use
doctrine is inapplicable to bar either a sale or public use.
b. Public Use Analysis
The policy behind the public use bar is to prevent what has been
dedicated to the public or detrimentally relied on by the public as being in
the public domain from becoming part of a patent monopoly. Was there a
public use of the invention? Showing the invention to a major competitor,
an agricultural journalist, as well as professors in the art evidences
forfeiture or dedication of the invention to the public. Such a showing
could create public detrimental reliance. For instance, Powell Corporation,
the defendant and alleged infringer infHarrington, built a similar invention,
possibly relying on the presumption that the invention was part of the
public domain.02
20' See Harrington, 815 F.2d at 1481.
201 See id. Section 102(b) also prohibits the patenting of an invention that was
"patented or described in aprinted publication in this ora foreign country... more
than one year prior to the date of application for patent" 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1994). This issue, however, was not raised on appeal. See Harrington, 815 F.2d
at 1478.2o2 See Harrington, 623 F. Supp. at 873-74.
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In Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Construction,20 3 the court
combined public use and on sale bar issues. This case concerned an
invention of an all-weather athletic running track. The inventor, Maxfield,
in association with Ritchie Paving Co. (Ritchie) installed an athletic track
at Beloit High School in Beloit, Kansas. Maxfield continuedto monitor the
condition ofthe track from May 1981 through spring 1982. Maxfield filed
his patent application in August 1982. Seal-Flex, the assignee, sued
Athletic Track and Court Construction ("ATCC") for patent infringement.
At trial, the court granted ATCC summary judgment invalidating the
subject patents based on an on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).21
Because there was conflicting evidence regarding whether one of
Ritchie's employees made an offer to sell a product from the patented
process before the critical date, the court concluded the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment. If "the Beloit track required evaluation under
actual conditions ofweather and use in order to determine whether it would
be satisfactory for its intended purpose, then it could not be held as a matter
of law that contacts with potential future customers started the one-year bar
during that evaluation period."' The court found that material issues of
fact existed, precluding summary judgment.2"
The court discussed the proposition that an inventor cannot, however,
avoid the on sale bar simply by continuing to improve on the invention
after the sale. Because experimental use and on sale bar issues are not
treated as having separate distinct tests, it is often difficult to determine
when commercial activity creates a bar. It maybe necessary to define when
an invention is on sale commercially, separately from determining whether
experimentation took place. If the invention could be put into a patentable
form, the fact that the inventor is experimenting should not contravene the
on sale bar.2" 7 Judge Bryson, in his concurring opinion, recognized the
problem with the circular nature in which these issues have been analyzed
203 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, appeal after
remand, 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2o See id. at 1321 (citing Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 870
F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).205 Id. at 1322.
206 See id.
o See id. at 1325 (Bryson, 3., concurring).
An inventor should not be able to sell his invention for commercial
purposes, but avoid the on-sale bar by separately conducting tests on his
invention.... If the ... transaction constituted an offer to make a
commercial sale.., the on-sale bar should be triggered even if... [the
inventor] was concurrently conducting tests....
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and set forth the following rule: "[I]fthe sale or offer in question embodies
the invention for which a patent is later sought, a sale or offer to sell that
is primarily for commercial purposes and that occurs more than one year
before the application renders the invention unpatentable.20 8
3. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyondthe statutory period. Was the invention the subject of a commercial
sale? It is unclear whether there was a commercial sale because Seal-Flex
was improperly decided on summary judgment, before genuine issues of
material fact couldbe resolved on the sale issue. 9 On remand, the § 102(b)
bar defense was dismissed.210
Under the Pfaff test, Seal-Flex may have been decided differently at
the district court level. Even if there were a commercial sale, the invention
may not have been ready for patenting if "the Beloit track required
evaluation under actual conditions of weather and use in order to determine
whether [the track] wouldbe satisfactory for its intended purpose."' I Thus,
the statutory one-year bar clock would not start running during the
evaluation period. If such evidence existed, the invention was not ready for
patenting because there was still experimentation. Consequently, there
would be no on sale bar.
2
1
8 Id. The Supreme Court, in Pfaff, comments that evidence satisfying Judge
Bryson's test:
[M]ight be sufficient to prove that the invention was ready for patenting at
the time of the sale if it is clear that no aspect of the invention was
developed after the critical date. However, the possibility of additional
development after the offer from sale in these circumstances counsels
against adoption of [this] rule....
Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 312 n.14. It should be noted, however, that any sale would
create § 102(b) prior art that could be used in the context of an obviousness inquiry
under § 103. If the subject matter of a patent application claims an invention is an
obvious step from what was on sale before the critical date, the invention would be
unpatentable under § 103. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
209 There was conflicting evidence concerning whether one of Ritchie's
employees made an offer to sell before the critical date. See Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at
1322.
2I See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., No. 91-CV-60494-
AA, slip op. (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 1997).
211 Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1322.
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b. Public Use Analysis
The trial court denied summary judgment on the public use issue in this
case because genuine issues of fact remained. Thus, the issue was not
appealable to the Federal Circuit.212
B. Case EvaluatingExperimental UseInstead ofFocusingon Whether the
Use is Public
Evaluating whether a use is experimental instead of focusing on
whether a use is public diminishes the policies behind the § 102(b) bar. An
example of this situation occurred in Lough v. Brunswick Corp.
13
In Lough, the inventor, Lough, worked as a repairman at a boat
dealership in Sarasota, Florida. While repairing Brunswick boats, he
noticed that the upper seal assemblies for stem drives used in aquatic
motors had a tendency to corrode. Lough, having only a high school
education, invented an upper seal assembly to prevent this corrosion. After
much trial and error, Lough made six prototypes on his grandfather's metal
lathe. All six prototypes were installed on various marine vehicles,
including four of his friends' boats, his own boat, and the owner of the
marina's boat, where he worked. Lough did not charge anyone for the use
of his invention.214 Lough testified he gave the prototypes to his acquain-
tances in order to determine whether his seal assembly invention would
work, under different conditions, for at least a year, the normal warranty
period.215 Witnesses testified that "there was no payment for the seal, and
that they knew it was a handmade prototype whose performance was being
evaluated.
'216
212 See id. at 1321.
213 Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
214 See id. at 1123-24.
215 See Lough, 103 F.3d at 1521 (Lourie, J., concurring). Mr. Lough testified he
sought more extensive and varied use than that of his own boat.
Well, Jack Wherry's boat constantly satinthe water. My boat, I take--it
was on a railer....
And I explained to Jack what I want to do, I wanted to put a seal in his
boat for testing purposes to see if it would last, because his boat sat in the
water all the time. And when it comes back to the marina, then I could look
at it and I could test-I could, you know, make sure everything in it was
just fine.
Id.
216 Id. at 1522.
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Two years after the prototypes were first made, Lough filed a patent
application issuing a year later. After learning of Lough's invention,
Brunswick Corporation ("Brunswick") developed an improved upper seal
assembly. Lough sued Brunswick for patent infringement. Brunswick
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment alleging, inter alia, that the
patent was invalid because the invention was in public use prior to the
critical date. The jury found infringement. Brunswick made a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, which was denied. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of the judgment as a matter of law
and vacated the damage award. The Federal Circuit held that "the jury's
determination that Lough's use of the invention was experimental so as to
defeat the assertion of public use was incorrect as a matter of law."217 The
court reversed the trial court's denial of Brunswick's motion for judgment
as a matter of law." The damage award was vacated.
InLough, bothparties agreedthat Lough's prototypes wereusedbefore
the critical date, but the question on appeal was whether the invention was
in public use prior to the critical date within the meaning of § 102(b). The
court set forth criteria in determining whether a use is considered experi-
mental:
To determine whether a use is "experimental," a question of law, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including various
objective indicia of experimentation surrounding the use, such as the
number of prototypes and duration of testing, whether records or progress
reports were made concerning the testing, the existence of a secrecy
agreement between the patentee and the party performing the testing,
whether the patentee received compensation for the use of the invention,
and the extent of control the inventor maintained over the testing.
... The question framed on this appeal is whether Lough's alleged
experiments lacked enough of these required indicia so that his efforts
cannot, as a matter of law, be recognized as experimental. 219
The court found that Lough: (1) did not commercialize his invention;
(2) "kept no records of the alleged testing;" ' (3) did not "inspect the seal
217 Lough, 86 F.3d at 1122.
218 See id. at 1123.
2191d. at 1120-21 (citing TP Lab., Inc. v. ProfessionalPositioners, 724 F.2d 965,
971-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982
F.2d 494,498 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d
1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
220 Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121.
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assemblies afterthey hadbeen installedby other mechanics;"' and (4) did
not "maintain any supervision and control over the seals during the alleged
testing." m In finding these facts and applying the aforementioned test, the
court concluded that Lough's use was not experimental. 3 Thus, it was a
public use violation under § 102(b).
The problem with the court's analysis is that the court looks at the
traditional factors surroundingthetotalityofthe circumstances test without
adequately reflecting on the policies underlying such test. The Federal
Circuit applied the totality of the circumstances test in Lough as if it were
an exception to public use, rather than a negation. The court set forth a
standard for experimental use, defining factors required in order for this use
to be experimental. Evaluating whether ause is public depends on"how the
totality of the circumstances of the case comports with the policies
underlying the public use bar,"' ' 4 and does not depend on the experimental
use exception to the bar.?3
These policies include:
(1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of inventions
that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available;
(2) favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions; (3)
allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales
activity to determine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4)
prohibiting the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention
for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time.
226
Although the court cited these policies, it didnot analyze them in terms
of whether or not Lough's use was public. The court did not ask whether
Lough's use was a public one as defined by the statute. The court "set up
separate requirements for a separate doctrine of experimental use, instead
of analyzing the case under the public use criteria." 7 This is an analytical
problem because the court looked at the traditional factors surrounding the
totality of the circumstances test without adequately reflecting on the
2 Id.
mId.
n' See id. at 1122.
2 Id. at 1119 (quoting Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)).
22 See id.
n Id. (quoting Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198).




policies underlying such a test. Experimental use is merely one way in
which a use is not public. 8 The court required the traditional factors for
experimental use to be met. If such factors were not met, the use was a
public one. Thus, if it is not experimental use, it must be a public use. In
essence, the court said the negation to experimental use is public use.
This application of the law is not found anywhere in the statute or the
case law. The term "experimental use" does not appear anywhere in §
102(b). 9 Therefore, a use is not required to be experimental in order to
evade a public use bar under § 102(b). Instead of resolving whether the
use was forfeited or dedicated to the public, the court applied the totality
of the circumstances test to determine whether Lough's use was experi-
mental. 0
Lough invented an upper seal assembly that would prevent corrosion
and solve an old problem. This invention, however, took time to test under
varying conditions, much like the invention in City of Elizabeth v.
American Nicholson Pavement Co.2 Unlike City ofElizabeth, however,
there were no confidentiality agreements between Lough and his acquain-
tances. As in Moleculon, no confidentiality agreements seemed to have
been necessary because there was no evidence that Lough's invention was
in any way ever known or dedicated to the public. Like in City ofElizabeth,
Lough installed the seals himself, so no workmen or others skilled in the
art saw the invention. 2
There is testimony that Lough's acquaintances knew the purpose for
installing the seals was to determine if corrosion would occur. Lough relied
on his relationship with these acquaintances to keep his invention
confidential. Lough alleged that his prototypes were being used for
experimental purposes and were unlikely to be seen by the public. The
court ignored the importance of whether the prototypes were to be seen by
the public?.13 The court quoted Egbert v. Lippmann234 to support its
position:
See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (citing the trial court opinion which states that private use of one's own
invention is permissible).
" See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(Lourie, 3., concuning) (stating that "[e]xperimental use is not of course a term of
the statute [102(b)]").230 See Lough, 86 F.3d at 1119.
23uCity of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126(1877).
232 SeeLough, 86 F.3d at 1121.
233 See id. at 1122.
' Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
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[S]ome inventions are by their very character only capable of being used
where they cannot be seen or observed by the public eye. An invention
may consist of a lever or spring, hidden in the running gear of a watch, or
of a rachet, shaft, or cog-wheel covered from view in the recesses of a
machine for spinning or weaving. Nevertheless, if its inventor sells a
machine of which his invention forms a part, and allows it to be used
without restriction of any kind, the use is a public one? 5
In this quote, however, the critical word is "sells." In Lough, there is no
evidence that Lough commercialized his invention. 6 It makes sense and
is consistent with the principles outlining the public use and on sale bars
that commercializing an invention that inherently cannot be seen by the
public is a § 102(b) public use bar violation? 7 One of the critical policies
behind the § 102(b) on sale bar is to prohibit the inventor from "commer-
cially exploiting the invention for a period greater than the statutorily
prescribed time."' 8
The facts inEgbert and Lough can easily be distinguished, however. In
Egbert, the invention was complete at a time before the critical date; it was
ready for patenting. 9 Barnes invented the corset-springs in 1855 and did
not apply for a patent until March 1866. During that time "the invention
had found its way into general, and almost universal, use."240 Having
realized the value of his invention, Barnes "attempted to resume, by his
application, what by his acts he had clearly dedicated to the public." '24
Unlike in Lough, the Court analyzed whether the invention had been
publicly seen and consequently abandoned to the public. Clearly, the
invention in Egbert had been dedicated to the public and thus was within
the public domain by the time the inventor filed for patent. The public had
detrimentally relied that the invention was in the public domain as it was
in general, if not universal use.242
235Lough, 86 F.3d at 1122 (quotingEgbert, 104 U.S. at 336) (emphasis added).
23 Seeid. at 1121.
237 See Metallizing Eng'g v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, Inc., 153 F.2d 516,
519-20 (2d Cir. 1946).
11 Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
231 See Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337 (stating that the corset-steels "were not
presented for the purpose of experiment, nor to test their qualities" and "It]he







In addition, there is no evidence that Lough was trying to extend his
monopoly period beyond that which is statutorily provided for under the
patent laws. He did not charge anyone for the use of the seals. He engaged
in no market testing to gain an unfair competitive advantage over competi-
tors beyond that which is provided through the patent monopoly.243
The Federal Circuit in Lough did not ask the critical questions: were
Lough's upper seal assemblies forfeited or dedicated to the public, and
did the public rely on the invention being in the public domain? Instead,
the Federal Circuit focused on, inter alia, the type of records Lough kept
in determining whether the invention was under the inventor's con-
trol.2" Emphasizing the need to keep records is problematic because it is
uncertain what type of records for testing would have satisfied the court.
This invention is for seal assemblies. It is possible that no news is good
news. If the seals work, what kind of feedback is expected? Whether or not
Lough kept records should not be dispositive. In any case, different
standards of recordkeeping may apply to various scientific areas. For
example, chemical and biological inventions may require daily reports.
Electrical and mechanical inventions, however, may only need monthly or
weekly reports. This kind of analysis is unnecessary if the court simply
asks whether the invention was dedicated to the public or whether the
public detrimentally relied that the invention had been put into the public
domain.
In addition, the Federal Circuit focused on whether Lough had engaged
in confidentiality agreements with the people to whom he furnished his
invention. The court looked for agreements24 but did not inquire whether
confidentialitywas actually obtained. Even ifLough engaged in confidenti-
ality agreements, if the invention found its way into the public domain such
that the public had detrimentally relied on the invention being in the public
domain, the use would still be considered a public one. Such a disclosure,
however, would give Lough an excellent contract claim against those who
divulged his secrets.
1. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
Using the new general rule of law test for public use, Lough probably
would have been decided differently.
243 See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2 4 See id. at 1122.
245 See id. at 1120-23.
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a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. Was the invention a subject of a commercial
sale? Lough did not charge anyone for the prototypes of his invention, nor
did he sell any seal assemblies before the critical date.24
b. Public Use Analysis
The policy behind the public use bar is to prevent what has been
dedicated to the public or detrimentally relied on by the public as being in
the public domain from becoming part of a patent monopoly. Was there a
public use of the invention? There was no evidence that Lough's invention
was in anyway ever known or dedicated to the public. Lough was the only
one who installed the seals,247 unlike in Hall v. Macneale,248 where various
workmen assembled the safes embodying the invention.4 9 Lough did not
share how the seals worked with anyone. The uses were unlikely to be seen
by the public. In fact, there was no evidence that the invention was seen or
in anyway shown to the public.250
Because there was no sale andno public use, whether the invention was
ready for patenting need not be determined in order to avoid the § 102(b)
bar to patentability. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the invention was
not ready for patenting before the critical date. In order to determine
whether the seals worked, Lough needed to test them under differing
conditions.25 '
C. Design Patent Cases
Experimental use is an issue that has complicated public use and on
sale analysis in utility patent cases, as well as in design patent cases.
Patents for designs maybe granted to "[w]hoever invents any new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. '2 2 A design patent
246 See id. at 1116.
247 See id. at 1121.
24 Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 97 (1882).
249 See id.250 See Lough, 86 F.2d at 1122.
-
51 See id. at 1119.
2535 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title. The provisions of this title relating to
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protects the ornamental design that is claimed as the invention. The claim
is an illustration of the design that defines the property of the invention.
Because it is difficult to envision why a design would need to be experi-
mented upon to perfect the design, the experimental use doctrine has been
applied inconsistently.S
3
In In re Mann, 4 the invention was drawn to a design for a wrought
iron table. The patent claim, "as in all design cases... [was] limited to
what... [was] shown in the application drawings."2 5s A table embodying
the design in the drawings was publicly displayed at a trade show in the
United States prior to the critical date. The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences affirmed the examiner's rejection of the design patent claim
as being in public use in violation of§ 102(b). The inventor, Mann, claimed
the "'table was not used in its natural and intended way' because it was
'merely on display.' "256 Thus, the use was not public. Even if in public,
Mann argued that showing the table was an experimental use3ll
The court disagreed, finding that there is "no way in which an
ornamental design for an article of manufacture can be subject to the
'experimental use' [doctrine] ... applicable in the case of... [utilitarian]
machines, manufactures, or processes." ''5 The court interpreted the use as
merely a way to gauge people's reactions to the design. "[W]hether or not
they like it is not 'experimentation' in that sense. ' 9 The court found that
even if the design is changed after the market testing demonstrated that the
design had no appeal, the new design encompassed a different patent claim;
the original design remained unchanged.
260
1. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. If the table is displayed at a trade show, it is
patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise
provided." Id. The term for a design patent is "fourteen years from the date of
grant."Id. § 173.
'- See supra notes 213-275 and accompanying text.
54In reMann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
255 Id. at 1582.
2 61Id. at 1581.
217 See id.
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probably being offered for sale. This violates the purpose behind the bar as
it is extending the monopoly period. Is the design ready for patenting? Yes.
If the table encompassing the design is ready to be sold at a trade show, the
design works for its intended purpose as a table.
b. Public Use Analysis
The policy behind the public use bar is to prevent what has been
dedicated to the public or detrimentally relied on by the public as being in
the public domain from becoming part of a patent monopoly. Was there a
public use of the invention? Displaying the table at a trade show is a use
likely to place the design into general or universal use. Those in similar
trades can view the table and gain access to the design. The inventor is
using the trade show to obtain the public's reaction to the design. The use
in this case is not experimental because the table works for its intended
purpose. There is no design flaw making the table unfit to function as a
table.
There may be situations, however, in which modifications to a design
patent are essential to the utility ofthe article ofmanufacture for which the
patent covers. Experimenting with these design changes may negate public
use in certain situations.
The seminal case for experimental use in design cases is Tone Bros. v.
Sysco Corp.26' Tone Brothers ("Tone") was engaged in testing a new plastic
spice container versus an existing tin spice container. To do its testing,
Tone randomly selected ten college students majoring in dietetics. The
students, however, did not sign confidentiality agreements. The testing
covered functional features of the containers. For example, the students
were asked how the containers felt while holding them, "which container
they liked best and why; and.., how the containers felt when shaking out
their contents."2 62 None of the questions asked the students if they liked
how the design looked. The testing occurred prior to the critical date.
Sysco, the alleged infringer, argued that Tone's use was apublic one under
§ 102(b), invalidating its patent. Tone argued the use was experimental,
negating public use.263
The court used the totality of the circumstances test to determine
whether there was a public use. The court noted that "[e]vidence of
experimentation is part of the totality of the circumstances considered in
1 Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
262Id. at 1197.
26 See id. at 1197-98.
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the public use inquiry.' 64 The court adopted the method of evaluating
public use from TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Practitioners,265
asking only one question: "was there a public use within the meaning of
section 102(b)?" 266
The court differentiated between the use that occurred inIn re Mann,267
where the displaywas "directed toward generating consumer interest in the
aesthetics of the design,' 2 6 and the use in this case, where the display was
directed towards improving the functional aspects of the structure
embodying the design. Here, the court determined displaying the design
was for "testing the functional features of the design."'269 This is "experi-
mentation directed to functional features of a product also containing an
ornamental design [and] may negate what otherwise would be a public use
... [under the statute]. 270
In its analysis, however, the issues of on sale and public use were
discussed together and intertwined. As the court made distinctions between
In re Mann and Tone Bros., the court mixed the underlying principle of the
on sale bar in discussing public use:
[T]he display of the design in Mann, unlike the display in the present
case, appears to have been for a purpose directly contrary to thepublic
use bar policy of preventing an extension of the patent term through pre-
application commercial exploitation. Given the fact that the wrdught iron
table design in Mann was exhibited at a trade show, an exploitative
purpose seems to have been present. Because of the commercial nature of
a trade show, it must be assumed that the table was ready to be sold to
consumers and that the manufacturer had already made sure that the
ornamental design of the table did not detract from the practical function-
ing of the table. In the present case, however, there appears to have been
a lack of exploitative purpose. The design was shown to students, not at
a trade show, and.., the students did not know the identities of the
companies associated with the various designs they were shown. In
addition, it appears that the showing was for the purpose of testing the
functional features of the design.
27 1
264Id. at 1198.
25 TP Lab., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
266 Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198.
267 In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
268 Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1199 (citing In re Mann, 861 F.2d at 1581).
269 Id.
270 Id. at 1200.271Id. at 1199 (emphasis added).
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The public use and on sale bars have different policy goals. Each
should be discussed separately to maintain the integrity of these issues.
2. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. Was there a commercial sale of the article
manufacture encompassing the design? No. The containers were donated
to the students for testing. No commercialization took place.
Was the invention ready for patenting? The purpose of the testing was
to see if the new plastic containers were an improvement over the existing
tin containers. The testing focused on the functional aspects of the
invention. The design covered the appearance of the containers, which
served a utilitarian purpose. If the purpose could not be satisfied using this
design, it would need to be changed so that the containers would work for
their intended purpose. Thus, the use was experimental.
b. Public Use Analysis
The policy behind the public use bar is to prevent what has been
dedicated to the public or detrimentally relied on by the public as being in
the public domain from becoming part of a patent monopoly. Was there a
public use of the article of manufacture encompassing the design before the
critical date? The use was part of testing, which implies that the inventor
is not dedicating the invention to the public. The students, however, were
not required to keep the testing confidential. There were only ten students
doing the testing, though.272 These were not people in the business of
making containers, as in In re Mann, where the display was at a trade show.
It is unlikely that such a use would give rise to the public detrimental
reliance that the invention was in the public domain.
Even if the use were considered public, the invention was not ready for
patenting. Thus, the use was not public. (The experimental use analysis is
the same as in the aforementioned on sale analysis).
In contrast to the holding in Tone Bros.,273 the Federal Circuit, in
Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Products, Inc.,274 held
272 See id. at 1197.
273 See id. at 1200 (holding that "experimentation directed to functional features
of a product to which an ornamental design relates may negate.., public use
within the meaning of section 102(b)").
274 Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141
F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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that "[s]ince design inventions are reduced to practice as soon as an
embodiment is constructed, ... experimental use negation is virtually
inapplicable in the design patent context."275 The court expressed concern
over allowing "entities to increase the life oftheir design patents merely by
tarrying over the production of the article of manufacture."276
In ContinentalPlastic, Continental Plastic Containers ("Continental")
and Owens-Brockway Plastic Products, Inc. ("Owens") were competitors
in wholesaling plastic juice containers. Continental owned a design patent
on an "ornamental design for an exterior surface of a side wall for a juice
container." '27 Continental sued Owens for, inter alia, design patent
infringement. Owens alleged Continental had sold or offered to sell
containers embodying the design patent before the critical date, February
16, 1992. The trial court granted Owens summary judgment motion,
holding Continental's patent invalid under § 102(b).278 The Federal Circuit
affirmed.279
Continental offered the patented design to customers and agreed to
supply L&A Juice, Inc. ("L&A") with bottles embodying the patented
design before the critical date, February 16, 1992. In 1990, before
Continental's relationship with L&A began, Continental had presented
drawings of a similar design to Tree Top, another potential customer.
Continental began similar drawings and presented seven of these drawings
to L&A. The first drawing was sent on October, 18 1991, the last was dated
August 19,1992. After several models were produced, a prototype
production mold was shipped to Continental on February 10, 1992, before
the critical date.28°
The trial court found that the design was revised seven times to
accommodate the manufacturing difficulties of the design after the critical
date. The trial court, however, noted that the changes to the drawings were
so minute that Continental's production designer had to use a measuring
instrument to distinguish among the seven drawings. Continental argued
that the patent was not subject to the on sale bar because, until after the
critical date, Continental was unable to produce a functionally operable
article embodying the design2 8 On appeal, Continental requested the
275 Id. at 1079.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1075-76.
278 See Continental Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc.,
No. 95 C 4670, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1793, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1996).
279 See Continental Plastic, 141 F.3d at 1073.
280 See id. at 1077.
281 See id.
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Federal Circuit "to extend Tone Bros .... to hold that any adjustments to
functional features of the article of manufacture suspends the application
of a section 102(b) bar for the purpose of claiming the ornamental
design. "282
The Federal Circuit refused to extend Tone Bros. to on sale bar cases.
It noted:
Tone Bros. is a "public use" case. We see no reason to extend the analysis
to the "on-sale" context. "Public use" and"on-sale" bars, while they share
the same statutory basis, are grounded on different policy emphases. The
primary policy underlying the "public use" case is that of detrimental
public reliance, whereas the primary policy underlying an "on-sale" case
is that of prohibiting the commercial exploitation of the design beyond the
statutorily prescribed time period.... [I]n Tone Bros.... the display was
not contrary to the policy of detrimental public reliance because the
display was for the sole purpose of experimentation. In contrast,
Continental's agreement to sell the patented design is an explicit
commercial exploitation of the claimed design outside of the generous one
year grace period. 83
The court ultimately held that design inventions are reduced to practice
as soon as the embodiment is constructed, thus making the experimental
use negation virtually inapplicable in the design patent context. Conse-
quently, the summary judgment invalidating Continental's patent under §
102(b) was affirmed.84
The problem with the court's analysis stems from distinguishing
Continental Plastic from Tone Bros. because the former is an on sale bar
case and the latter is a public use case. Because there is commercialization
in Continental Plastic, unlike in Tone Bros., the court concluded that the
sale is a violation ofthe underlying policy, prohibiting extending the patent
beyond the statutory period" 5 In effect, the court did not apply the
experimental use analysis from Tone Bros., because of the distinction
between public use policy and on sale bar policy. Although both have
different policy distinctions, whether a use is experimental is not encom-
passed in these distinctions. Experimental use should be evaluated in
determining whether or not the invention is ready for patenting. Under
282Id. at 1078.
283 Id. at 1078-79.
2 See id. at 1079-80.
28 See id. at 1080.
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Pfaff, an invention that is not ready for patenting, cannot be the subject of
an on sale bar.286 In addition, the existence ofcomm ercialization should not
eliminate the possibility of finding a use or sale to be for experimental
purposes. Because the court rejects the Tone Bros. holding that there could
be experimentation in testing the functional aspects of a design, the court
determines whether a bar to patentability is appropriate in this case. To
accomplish this end, the court must look at whether the design from which
the article was sold was ready for patenting. "
3. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. Was the invention the subject of a commercial
sale? Yes. The transaction between Continental and L&A was primarily for
commercial purposes. Continental looked to both Tree Top and L&A to be
potential customers.287
Was the invention ready for patenting before the critical date? Perhaps.
A design patent is directed to the appearance of an article of manufacture.
If an article of manufacture serves a utilitarian purpose, it is logical that the
design should allow the article to function for its intended purpose.288 'Thus
the bar to patenting should not accrue until the design of the article is
successfully completed. The design of an article of manufacture is not
complete until the design is useful, that is, until the article as designed has
been shown to be capable of its intended use."289 In this case, there were
seven revisions of the drawings. The trial court, however, found that the
changes to the drawings were so insignificant as to not make any meaning-
ful distinction among the drawings.2" Because this case was decided on
summary judgment, there are not enough facts in the record to determine
whether or not the design was ready for patenting. If the court had extended
the Tone Bros. holding to this case, it probably would have remanded the
case. On remand, the trial court would need to determine whether the
invention was ready for patenting when the containers were sold prior to
the critical date.
1 6 See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304,311-12 (1998).
287 See Continental Plastic, 141 F.3d at 1077.
288 See id. at 1081 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299 Id. at 1081-82.
290See id. at 1078.
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b. Public Use Analysis
Public use was not an issue in Continental Plastic.
In Allied Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,291 the invention
covered polymeric flocculents and the method of treating sewage using
these materials. Colloids contacted the City of Detroit in order to test
samples of municipal waste. At Colloids' invitation, Detroit sludge was
sent to England, where the invention was developed, for testing. After the
tests were favorable, twenty samples of Colloids' sewage treatment
materials were brought to Detroit to test fresh Detroit sewage. This testing
occurred April 16-17, 1985, one week prior to the critical date of April 23,
1985.292 The tests were promising and further laboratory tests were
conducted in July 1985. Plant-scale trials were done in December 1985.293
The trial court held the April 16-17 tests were a public use because the
principal grounds for the tests had commercial motives. No confidentiality
agreements between the parties were drawn. The trial court invalidated the
patents under the public use bar as a matter of law.219 The Federal Circuit
disagreed, applying the totality of the circumstances test.295
First, the court rejected the trial court's assertion that the experimenta-
tionwas commercially motivated: "Commercial purpose underlies virtually
every contact between inventor and potential customer. When testing an
invention entails customer contact, that does not convert an otherwise
experimental purpose into a public use."2 6 Next, the court recognized the
tests were not observed by anyone other than Colloids' employees. There
was testimony "that no one from the City of Detroit was involved in the
tests or knew what products were being tested."297 Although no confidenti-
ality agreements were signed, "no information of a confidential nature was
communicated to others."298
The court also stated Colloids did not receive payment from the City
of Detroit for any of the tests.2' In evaluating experimental use, the court
291 Allied Colloids Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
292 See id. at 1573.
293 See id.
294 See id. at 1573-74.
295 See id. at 1574-75.
296 Id. at 1575.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See id. at 157.6.
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noted that Colloids prepared detailed records of tests, indicating experi-
mentation.)°
4. Analysis Under Pfaff and the Proposed Test
a. On Sale Bar Analysis Under Pfaff
The policy behind the on sale bar is to prohibit extending patent rights
beyond the statutory period. Was the invention a subject of a commercial
sale? No. Colloids did not receive payment from the City of Detroit for any
of these tests. 01
b. Public Use Analysis
The policy behind the public use bar is to prevent what has been
dedicated to the public or detrimentally relied on by the public as being in
the public domain from becoming part of a patent monopoly. Was there a
public use of the invention before the critical date? No. There is no
evidence that the testing was in any way forfeited or dedicated to the
public. Only Colloids' employees conducted the testing.3"
Was the invention ready for patenting before the critical date? Because
there is neither a sale nor a public use, whether the invention is ready for
patenting need not be addressed. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the
invention was not ready for patenting. The testing included various stages
of testing, such as: laboratory testing on old sewage, laboratory testing on
fresh sewage, and plant-scale testing. Some of the testing occurred prior to
the critical date and some afterwards. Although not dispositive, Colloids
prepared detailed records of the tests." 3
CONCLUSION
In order to provide the public with proper notice and define the
boundaries of legally permissible conduct, the law needs to provide
certainty and predictability. This is particularly true in patent cases where
a significant property interest is at stake. Consistency in judicial
decisionmaking is critical in advancing public confidence in the rule of
30 See id.
301 See id.
302 See id. at 1575.
303 See id. at 1573, 1575-76.
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law. In order to achieve consistency, similarly situated cases should enjoy
comparable outcomes. Such an approach evinces the appearance of equal
treatment thereby promoting a sense of justice.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, has strayed
from rendering this type of consistency in interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)3 4
in public use and on sale bar cases. I-istorically, the Supreme Court
devoted attention to the underlying policies regarding the public use and on
sale bars in § 102(b). Adhering to the purposes behind the bars, the Court
maintained two lines of analysis consistent with the statutory division
between the public use and on sale bars.305 The Federal Circuit, however,
has deviated from that approach. Instead, the court has developed a totality
of the circumstances approach in its analysis.3 Although striving to be
sensitive to the equities in each case, this totality approach has led to a
blurring of the public use and on sale issues. This methodology failed to
consistently elucidate the policies behind the public use and on sale bars.
Consequently, this approach leaves too much room for judicial discretion
that could lead to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions.
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,07 the Supreme Court rejected the
totality of the circumstances test in on sale cases, using a more rule-based
approach in its analysis. In doing so, the Court replaced the totality of the
circumstances test with a more concrete general rule of law to create added
predictability in determining when a sale has transpired.0 8
Although, in Pfaff, the Supreme Court removed the totality of the
circumstances test in on sale bar cases, this shift did not address the
remaining and more difficult public use strand of § 102(b). This Article
provides an extension of the Pfaff approach and a specific rule that
reinvigorates the historic distinction between public use and on sale issues,
consequently enabling cases to be decided more consistently. After
reviewing the early Supreme Court cases 09 and policies, as well as the
Federal Circuit cases,310 this Article concludes that, after Pfaff, a general
rule of law is needed to determine public use in patent cases.
Historically, the on sale and public use bars to patentability have been
read together or analyzed in combination. In Pfaff, the Supreme Court
304 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
3oSee supra Part II.
30See supra Part I.
30Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 304 (1998).
308 See id. at 311-12.
31 See supra Part II.
310 See supra Part II.
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eliminated the totality of the circumstances test from the on sale bar
analysis. In doing so, the Court replaced this test with a more concrete
general rule of law to create predittability in resolving when a sale has
transpired. This test has two prongs that determine when a sale has
occurred: (1) "the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for
sale; ... [and (2)] the invention must be ready for patenting."'31 The Court,
however, did not address how the test for public use is affected by this
ruling, as public use was not an issue in Pfaff31 2 Because the on sale and
public use bars have been treated together, the elimination of the totality of
the circumstances test for one necessarily affects the other.
Because the on sale and public use bars have been analyzed in
combination, it is necessary to eliminate the current totality of the
circumstances test used to determine whether there has been a public use
in violation of § 102(b). Not only has the analysis inappropriately focused
on whether the use is experimental rather than public, the test may be
overly vague.
This Article's proposed test for public use is: (1) the invention must be
dedicated to the public or there must be detrimental public reliance that the
invention is in the public domain; and (2) the invention must be ready for
patenting. This test nearly parallels the Pfafftest, replacing the first prong
with the policies behind the public use bar. The second prong is identical
to the Pfafftest. The proposed test recognizes that the public use and on
sale bars have the same statutory basis, but treats them as distinct and
separate issues.
While preserving the experimental use doctrine's effects, the proposed
test properly focuses on whether or not the use is a public one rather than
whether or not the use is experimental. In other words, the question should
be whether the invention has been forfeited or dedicated to the public or
whether the public has detrimentally relied on the invention being in the
public domain.
311 Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 311-12. The second prong:
may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice
before the critical date; orby proof that prior to the critical date the inventor
had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were
sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the
invention.
Id. at 312.
312 The Court stated that "[t]he experimental use doctrine.., has not generated
concerns about indefiniteness." Id. (citing William C. Rooklidge & Stephen C.
Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity and Experimental Use Negation of the Public
Use and On Sale Bars to Patentability, 29 1 MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 29 (1995)).
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